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Abstract
In their 1959 proposal to build a new international legal order founded upon principles of
human dignity, Professors Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell admonished international legal
scholars to continuously reappraise the suitability and necessity of existing international legal institutions, taking due notice of the “myths” on which current arrangements are based and justified.’
The aim of this Article is to take McDougal and Lasswell’s admonition seriously in analyzing one
of the persistent myths that serves to explain and to justify bilateral investment treaties (”BIT”s)
that form the backbone of the modern system of international investment law. The author’s aim is
simply to establish that developing countries enjoy significant flexibility to exit the BIT systemif they come to the conclusion that BITs are, on net, undesirable-without harming their ability
to make binding commitments to investors on a case-by-case basis through investment contracts,
supported by international arbitration. In Part I, the author first briefly describes the modern BIT
regime. The author then summarize and discuss the most important extant theoretical study of
BITs and the source of the myth challenged here. Part II presents the mythic account of BITs. Part
III analyzes the extensive jurisprudence of international arbitral tribunals in the pre-BIT era, which
the author defines as the period prior to the 1990s. This jurisprudence demonstrates that international tribunals reliably expressed support in the abstract for the principle of pacta sunt servanda,
and that they reliably awarded investors meaningful compensation for violations of the principle.
Part IV discusses why the permanent sovereignty movement failed to make state promises unenforceable. Part V summarizes the Article’s main points and responds to four potential objections.
Part VI concludes.

PACTA SUNT SERVANDA AND STATE
PROMISES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS
BEFORE BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES: MYTH AND REALITY
Jason Webb Yackee*
I. INTRODUCTION
In their 1959 proposal to build a new international legal order founded upon principles of human dignity, Professors Myres
McDougal and Harold Lasswell admonished international legal
scholars to continuously reappraise the suitability and necessity
of existing international legal institutions, taking due notice of
the "myths" on which current arrangements are based and justified.' The aim of this Article is to take McDougal and Lasswell's
admonition seriously in analyzing one of the persistent myths
that serves to explain and to justify bilateral investment treaties
("BIT"s) that form the backbone of the modern system of international investment law.
The myth is the notion that, prior to the explosion of popularity of BITs in the early 1990s, developing countries were free
to break their promises to foreign investors with legal impunity.
In the mythic account, developing countries succeeded in destroying the principle of pacta sunt servanda, or "promises shall
be kept," through a series of United Nations General Assembly
("UNGA") resolutions related to the establishment of "perma* Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School; J.D. (Duke University);
Ph.D. (Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). I would like to
thank Mark Weidemaier for helpful comments and the University of Wisconsin Law
School for providing summer research support. I may be contacted at jason.yackee@alumni.duke.edu. © JWY.
1. Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 Am.J. IrNT'L L. 1, 13 (1959). McDougal and Lasswell's
essay was but one early entry in the vast opus that would become known as the New
Haven School of International Law and that would evolve into modern pluralist approaches to international law. For a critical review of McDougal and Lasswell's framework, see generally Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104 YALE LJ. 1991 (1995). On pluralist theories of international law, see
generally Paul Schiff Berman, A PluralistApproach to InternationalLaw, 32 YALEJ. INT'L L.
301 (2007); William W. Burke-White, InternationalLegal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
963 (2004).
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nent sovereignty over natural resources."2 BITs are popular, desirable, and perhaps even natural and necessary, the mythic account suggests, because they serve to reestablish the principle.
Reestablishment is important, because investors will not invest if
they believe that the country hosting their investment will
breach promises upon which the investor has relied. Once reassured by BITs that developing countries will not be able to break
their promises with impunity, foreign investors will be more
likely to invest. And developing countries, by thus credibly committing to live up to their word, will benefit from the resulting
flow of new investment, upon which their continued economic
development depends.'
My main argument is that, contrary to the myth, a long line
of international jurisprudence demonstrates that state promises
to foreign investors have been strongly presumptively enforceable as a matter of consistent international law and practice. This
line ofjurisprudence begins in the 1930s and consolidates in the
1970s with the great oil arbitrations, in which international tribunals, charged with resolving legal claims arising from petroleum
concession nationalizations in Libya and Kuwait, forcefully rejected extravagant claims by certain developing countries that
foreign investment contracts could be freely breached as a matter of sovereign right.
This jurisprudence demonstrates that could an investor
show to the satisfaction of a neutral, authoritative decisionmaker-typically, an international arbitral tribunal-that a state
had breached a promise to the investor, the investor would al2. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
3. However, empirical evidence that foreign direct investment ("FDI") is developmentally helpful is mixed. Some scholars suggest that increased FDI can be developmentally harmful under certain circumstances. See Theodore H. Moran et al., Conclusions and Implicationsfor IDI Policy in Developing Countries, New Methods of Research, and a
Future Research Agenda, in DOES FOREIGN DiiEcT INVESTMENT PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT?
375, 377 (Theodore H. Moran et al. eds., 2005). Empirical evidence that bilateral investment treaties ("BIT"s) increase foreign investment is also mixed; my own studies
suggest that the treaties do not lead to increased investment. See generally Jason Webb
Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International)
Law: Do BITs Promote ForeignDirect Investment?, 42 LAw & Soc'y REV. 805 (2008) [hereinafter Yackee, BilateralInvestment Treaties];Jason Webb Yackee, Do BITs Really Work? Revisiting the Empirical Link between Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment, in THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLows

Sachs, eds., 2009).

BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES,

379 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E.
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most certainly be awarded meaningful compensation. BITs have
had little or even nothing to do with the widespread and longstanding acceptance of this rule of presumptive enforceability. 4
This Article's argument is important because it suggests that
developing countries need not to embrace BITs as part of their
strategies to attract foreign investment. The BIT system has recently provoked a great deal of criticism and worry, as observers
digest the still unfolding experience of Argentina, which faces
many billions of dollars in international arbitral claims resulting
from its policy response to a severe economic crisis in 2002.'
While BITs, by providing investors with guaranteed access to international arbitration and to particular causes of action in the
event of a breach of promise, do undoubtedly support the enforcement of state promises to investors, they are not necessary
to render state promises enforceable. To a great extent, their
protections are simply redundant to those that already exist in
the form of strong international arbitral support for contractual
obligations.6 In other words, the currently predominant international legal arrangement for protecting foreign investments
from breaches of state promises is neither as natural nor as necessary as it is sometimes portrayed to be.
This Article remains largely neutral on the important question of whether BITs are, on net, good or bad, or desirable or
undesirable, as a matter of public policy. My aim is simply to
establish that developing countries enjoy significant flexibility to
exit the BIT system-if they come to the conclusion that BITs
are, on net, undesirable-without harming their ability to make
binding commitments to investors on a case-by-case basis
through investment contracts, supported by international arbitration.
This Article's methodology is informally empirical, focusing
on the published awards of international arbitral tribunals
charged with resolving contract-related disputes between foreign
investors and host states-that is, focusing on what Wolfgang
Friedmann calls the "individualising application of.

.

.guide-

4. See also Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 3, at 812.
5. See generally R. Doak Bishop & Roberto Aguirre Luzi, Investment Claims: First Lessons from Argentina, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING
CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAw 425 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005).
6. See infra Part III.
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posts by impartial arbiters to concrete and unique situations .... ." It is not fruitful to consider whether the principle of
pacta sunt servanda somehow can be said to exist or not to exist as
a universal principle residing in the abstract ether of customary
international law, separated from the context of concrete cases.8
What matters is whether in actual cases neutral, authoritative decision-makers claim that, and act as if, state promises to investors
are legally binding. This they do, and they have done it reliably
for many years, regardless of the presence or absence of BITs.9
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II presents the mythic
account of BITs. Part III analyzes the extensive jurisprudence of
international arbitral tribunals in the pre-BIT era, which I define
as the period prior to the 1990s. This jurisprudence demon7.

WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 199

(1964).
8. Because my analysis privileges actual arbitral decisions, I do not discuss in any
detail the various abstract doctrinal debates between publicists about the normatively
proper contours of pacta sunt servanda as an international legal principle governing
state contracts, or of how to properly classify the legal regime applicable to state contracts, or the like. However, it is worth noting that a thorough review of those debates
supports my basic contention here: that the right of states to unilaterally terminate or
modify their contractual obligations with investors is subject to important limitations,
the most important of which is to provide the investor with meaningful compensation
in the event of breach. See John A. Westberg & Bertrand P. Marchais, General Principles
GoverningForeign Investment as Articulated in Recent InternationalTribunal Awards and Writ-

ings of Publicists, in 1 WORLD BANK GROUP, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 135, 161-62, 165 (1992) (providing a review of relevant doctrinal
debates, and finding that while most publicists "do not appear to support the unqualified application of the principle of sanctity of contract, or that of pacta sunt servanda, to
State Contracts," nonetheless the "prevalent view ... is that the right of the State to
amend or terminate a State Contract is not absolute and ... may be made subject to
limitations," including the limitation that the public interest in termination be "essential" or "preeminent" and made in "good faith" and that the investor be compensated).
9. 1 am not the first to analyze the subject of pacta sunt servanda's place in international investment law. Professor Thomas W5lde, a distinguished scholar and practitioner of international investment law, has written a number of important articles addressing or touching upon the subject. See generally, Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Walde,
Renegotiation and Contract Adaptation in InternationalInvestment Projects: Applicable Legal
Principles and Industry Practices, 1 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 5 (2000); Thomas W. Wdlde &
George Ndi, Stabilizing InternationalInvestment Commitments: InternationalLaw Versus Contract Interpretation,31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 215 (1996). My analysis is largely compatible with
Wdlde's own, and owes many debts to his work, though, in my view, parts of his analysis
risk giving the reader a mistaken assumption that arbitral practice is less uniform and
less favorable as to the general enforceability of state promises than the cases actually

suggest. For another valuable and broader study, see generally
OF CON'TRACTS REVISITED:

A

NAGLA NASSAR, SANCTITY

STUDY IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LONG-TERM INTER-

NATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS

(1995).
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strates that international tribunals reliably expressed support in
the abstract for the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and that they
reliably awarded investors meaningful compensation for violations of the principle. Part IV discusses why the permanent sovereignty movement failed to make state promises unenforceable.
Part V summarizes the Article's main points and responds to
four potential objections. Part VI concludes.
II. PACTA SUNT SERVANDA & BITS: THE MYTH
In this Part, I first briefly describe the modern BIT regime.
I then summarize and discuss the most important extant theoretical study of BITs and the source of the myth challenged here.
A. Brief Introduction to BITs
The rapid diffusion of BITs is one of the most remarkable
recent developments in modern international law. Developing
countries have now signed thousands of the treaties, the vast majority since the early 1990s. 1' Most of these BITs contain a common suite of core substantive and procedural provisions designed to promote and protect foreign investment." These core
provisions typically include promises of highly vague but clearly
pro-investor standards of treatment, such as promises that investors will be treated "fair[ly] and equitab[ly]," or treated on a
most-favored-nation basis, or treated as well as domestic investors.' 2 Of particular relevance to the mythic account of BITs,
most of the treaties also contain promises of "adequate" compensation if the investor's property is expropriated or nationalized,
and many contain so-called "umbrella clauses"-express affirmations of the principle that states should live up to their promises
to investors. 3 Most modern treaties couple these substantive
10. The literature on BITs is, not surprisingly, growing rapidly. For helpful descriptive overviews of the treaties, and of trends in BIT signings, see generally RUDOLF
DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); UNITED NATIONS
CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1988);
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,

BILATERAL

INVESTMENT

TREATIES 1959-1999 (2000); UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S (1998).
11. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 10, at 97-118 (discussing the core provisions

of BITs); Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the EmpiricalStudy ofBilateralInvestment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INr'L L. 405, 415-16 (2008) (discussing the same argument).
12. See Yackee, supra note 11, at 416.
13. On the history of the umbrella clause and an analysis of recent arbitral juris-
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promises with guaranteed access to international arbitration that
investors can invoke in the event the host state breaches its BIT
obligations.14
The ubiquity of BITs and the potential expansiveness of the
vague causes of action that they provide to investors have led to
an explosion of international investment arbitration. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") is an arbitral facility affiliated with the World Bank and is
frequently granted jurisdiction over BIT-based investment disputes.1" Over the first twenty years of ICSID's existence, from
1966, the year the ICSID Convention16 entered into force,
through 1986, investors registered just twenty-one investment
disputes with the ICSID; in contrast, from 1987 through July 30,
2008, a comparable length of time, investors have registered 248
disputes. 17 In total, ICSID has concluded 162 arbitration proceedings, 8 and 124 ICSID arbitrations are currently pending. 9
Certain developing countries have been particularly exposed to
BIT-based litigation. Most dramatically, since 2000, Argentina
has faced over forty ICSID arbitrations, totaling approximately
US$16 billion in claims by investors allegedly harmed by Argentina's currency devaluation and associated policy responses to a
prudence applying it, see generally Thomas W. Walde, The "Umbrella" Clause on Investment Arbitration-A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Case, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 183 (2005).
14. See Yackee, supra note 11, at 423-33.
15. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. Investors may also gain access to International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") arbitration
through an ICSID arbitration clause in a contract, or through a state's consent to ICSID
arbitration contained in a municipal investment law. BITs are not necessary for an
investor to arbitrate an investment dispute before an ICSID tribunal. See Yackee, supra
note 11, at 447, 451. As the cases discussed infra illustrate, many contract-based investment disputes are also litigated before the International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC').
16. ICSID Convention, supra note 15.
17. Concluded cases are available at Int'l Ctr. for the Settlement of Inv. Disputes
[ICSID], List of Concluded Cases (Apr. 24, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConcluded
[hereinafter ICSID, List of Concluded Cases], and pending cases are available at ICSID, List of Pending
Cases (Apr. 24, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
GenCaseDdsRH&action Val=ListPending [hereinafter ICSID, List of Pending Cases].
18. See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, supra note 17.
19. See ICSID, List of Pending Cases, supra note 17.
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severe economic crisis in the early 2000s. 2"
The rise of investment arbitration, and Argentina's travails
in particular, have led to a corresponding rise in discontent with
the BIT system.2 1 Scholars have argued that inconsistent decisions by arbitral tribunals threaten the legitimacy of the system, 2
that BITs give foreign investors an unfair competitive advantage
over domestic investors,23 that international arbitration under
BITs is biased in favor of investors, 24 or that it wrongly impinges
upon regulatory sovereignty, 25 among other criticisms. 26 Criticism is likely to further intensify as investors use BITs to mount
increasingly ambitious challenges to government policies in
highly sensitive issue areas. 27 For example, investors are currently suing South Africa over its Black Economic Empowerment
legislation, which aims to counteract the historical legacy of
apartheid by increasing black participation in the economy. 28
Investors are also increasingly using BITs, or their equivalent in20. See Bishop & Luzi, supra note 5, at 425. For Argentina's ICSID cases, see List of
Concluded Cases and List of Pending Cases, supra note 17.
21. See Yackee, supra note 11, at 459-60.
22. See generally Susan D. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
PrivatizingPublic International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1521 (2005).
23. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFFA's
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International"Regulatoy Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 129 (2003) (addressing the North American Free Trade
Agreement specifically).
24. See Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 167-75

(2007); Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided InternationalInvestment Law Regime and Its Effect
on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration,47 VA. J. INT'L L. 953, 958, 960 (2007). The note
critiques BITs as "unequal," "vague," imposing "burdensome restrictions on sovereignty," and as leading to "inequitable and excessive arbitral awards." Id. at 957, 959,
963, 965.
25. See, e.g., Robert Stumberg, Sovereignty by Subtraction: The MultilateralAgreement
on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 491, 492-95 (1998) (discussing the "sovereignty
tradeoffs" posed by investment treaties, and arguing that the failed attempt to construct
a "multilateral agreement on investment" represented a "depart[ure] from the fundamental values of federalism in the U.S. Constitution").
26. M. Sornarajah provides a brief overview of the most important critiques. See M.
SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 259-68 (2004).
27. Cf Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 404-05 (2006) (noting that the BIT

system has "given rise to a growing number of rather creative claims by investors" and
providing examples).
28. See Luke Eric Peterson, European Mining Investors Mount Arbitration over South
African Black Empowerment, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev.,
Winnipeg, Can.), Feb. 14, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/
itn_feb14_2007.pdf (discussing a lawsuit alleging South Africa's Black Economic Em-
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vestment chapters in free trade agreements ("FTA"s) like the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), to advance
claims against states that would be considered quixotic, if not
farcical, if brought under most domestic legal systems. For instance, a U.S. investor has recently filed a formal notice of intent
to sue Canada under the investment chapter of NAFITA after the
Canadian Prime Minister reneged on a campaign pledge to oppose raising taxes on Canadian energy income trusts. 29 For a
U.S. equivalent, and to get a sense of how quixotic, one need
only imagine a lawsuit by a Canadian investor seeking damages
from the U.S. government for the first President Bush's breach
of his ill-advised "read my lips: no new taxes" pledge.3"
B. The Mythic Account of BITs
The sheer number of investment treaties, that they have
given rise to interesting and novel legal claims, and that arbitral
tribunals formed under them are now among the most important generators of authoritative pronouncements on international law,3" have attracted the attention of social-scientifically
minded scholars of international law, who have sought to explain and justify the treaties' popularity.
Professor Andrew Guzman's 1998 article "Why [Less Developed Countries] Sign Treaties That Hurt Them" provides the
single most influential theoretical analysis of the treaties to
date.3 2 Guzman's theory has been favorably cited and applied in
the law and economics, 33 international business, 34 political scipowerment legislation "violates the terms of investment protection treaties concluded
by South Africa with Italy and Luxembourg").
29. For relevant documents, see NAFTA Trust Claims, http://www.naftatrust
claims.com (last visited Apr. 19, 2009), a propagandistic website established by an aggrieved U.S. investor and containing links to incriminating YouTube videos of the
prime minister promising at a news conference not to change the tax regime.
30. For a transcript of the entire speech, see American Rhetoric: George H.W.
Bush-1988 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address, http://www.
americanrhetoric.com/speeches/georgehbushl988rnc.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
31. As noted above, ICSID currently has 124 cases pending, see supra text accompanying note 19; the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), which decides international
disputes between states, has just fifteen, see Pending Cases in the International Court of
Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=1
(last visited Apr. 24,
2009).
32. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explainingthe Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998).
33. See Anne van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case of InternationalInvestment Protection, 9 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 1, 13 n.44 (2008) (citing Guzman and presenting an
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ence,345 and development economics literatures. 6 Given its influence, and that it is the primary source of the myth that BITs
are necessary to establish an international legal principle of pacta
sunt servanda, it is worth reviewing his argument in some detail.
For Guzman, one of the major potential impediments to increased foreign investment in the developing world is the possibility that developing country governments will change their policy regimes in ways that are harmful to the profitability of foreign
investment." The possibility of adverse changes of policy is especially problematic for foreign investors operating in sectors in
which the investment, once made, is difficult to redeploy outside
of the host state.38 For example, an investor in a mining operation cannot easily move the mine's ore, or even the heavy equipment that services the mine, in the event that the country hosting the investment decides to raise the royalty rate that the investor must pay for the privilege of operating the mine. Because
redeployment of fixed assets is costly, the investor may have no
choice but to accept the adverse policy change, even if the
change violates the terms and conditions that the investor reasonably expected to govern the investment at the time the investor decided to invest.
One of the challenges faced by developing countries that
wish to attract investment is to credibly guarantee to investors
argument similar to his that the main function of BITs "is to make the commitment of
the host State credible"); Ryan J. Bubb & Susan Rose-Ackerman, BITs and Bargains:
Strategic Aspects of Bilateral and MultilateralRegulation of Foreign Investment, 27 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 291, 292 (2007) (describing Guzman's discussion as "seminal" before
"build[ing] on and critiqu[ing]" Guzman's model).
34. See Louis T. Wells, ProtectingForeign Investors in the Developing World: A Shift in
US Policy in the 1990s?, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE
21sT CENTURY 421, 444 n.24 (Robert Grosse ed., 2005) (describing Guzman's theory as
"well-argued").
35. See Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competingfor Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 811 (2006)
(testing statistically an implication of Guzman's theory).
36. See Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do BilateralInvestment Treaties Increase Foreign
Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567, 1569-70 (2005).
37. Guzman refers to this problem as one of "dynamic inconsistency," under which
a "preferred course of action, once undertaken, cannot be adhered to without the establishment of some commitment mechanism." Guzman, supra note 32, at 658.
38. Assets that are difficult to redeploy outside of a given relationship are often
referred to in the economics literature as having a high degree of "asset specificity." See,
e.g.,
Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73
Am. ECON. REv. 519, 526 (1983).
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that the policies governing their investment will not be changed
in ways that violate the investor's initial expectations. As A.A.
Fatouros notes in his classic 1962 study of "Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors," for many investors
some assurance as to the future is needed. The investor must
be made to believe that there is little or no possibility that an
unfavorable legal situation will be created at a later date ....
In the case of most underdeveloped countries today.., it is
impossible to predict with confidence that conditions of stability and security will exist during the period of dynamic
change ahead. Thus arises the need for legal guarantees, to
be given by the state or states concerned to foreign investors.
The guaranteeing states have to commit themselves as to the
future, to promise that certain measures are not going to be
taken, that certain others will continue to be taken, or that
the investor will be39 compensated for any loss due to changes
in such measures.
These government guarantees might take the form of provisions in municipal legislation or, quite frequently in the natural
resources sector, in which investments are both difficult to redeploy and often politically sensitive, in the form of formal contracts between the host state and the foreign investor.4 °
To Guzman, the popularity of BITs is explained largely as a
response to successful efforts by developing countries, acting collectively through the UNGA in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, to
destroy rules of customary international law that supported the
enforceability of these guarantees. In his story, developing countries used a series of UNGA resolutions related to the movement
to establish "permanent sovereignty over natural resources" as
an international legal principle, and culminating in the 1974
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States4 ' ("CERDS"),
to attack and eliminate the so-called "Hull Rule" of customary
international law.4 2 Developed countries have long argued that
custom required that investors should always and with no exceptions receive "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation
39. A.A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES To FOREIGN INVNESTORS 63 (1962)

(internal citations omitted).
40. See id. at 69-128, 232-301.
41. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974) [hereinafter
CERDS].
42. See Guzman, supra note 32, at 644-51.
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where the foreign investor's property has been taken (e.g., expropriated or nationalized) by the host government.4" This alleged rule of custom was originally articulated by U.S. Secretary
of State Cordell Hull in response to Mexico's 1938 nationalization of the petroleum industry," and since that time the U.S.
government has insisted that the customary rule is and always
has been that "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation
(which I refer to in shorthand below simply as "adequate" compensation) is always required.4 5
What "adequate" compensation is supposed to entail in
practice is not always entirely clear, but commentators typically
suggest that it means "full"4 6 or 'Just"4 7 compensation that fairly
reflects the market value of the property taken. This is the approach taken in modern U.S. BITs, which affirm that adequate
compensation is always due in the event of expropriation, and
which typically clarify that adequate compensation means "fair
market value."4 8 In the investment contract setting, we can also
usefully think of adequate compensation as somewhat analogous
to what contract law scholars typically refer to as "expectation
damages"-the principle that if a legally enforceable promise
has been breached, the victim is entitled to be placed in the position he would have occupied had the promise been fully performed.4 9
Developing country challenges to the U.S. position were
mild at first, to say the least. A two-paragraph 1952 UNGA resolution on the "right freely to use and exploit their natural wealth
43. Property Rights: General Considerations, 3 Hackworth DIGEST § 288, at 658-59.
44. See id.
45. See Guzman, supra note 32, at 645 n.19 (discussing U.S. statutory incorporation
of the Hull Rule).
46. See Frank G. Dawson & Burns H. Weston, "Prompt,Adequate and Effective": A
Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 727, 737-38 (1962).
47. See Georg Schwarzenberger, The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments
Abroad: A Critical Commentary, 9J. PUB. L. 147, 161 (1960).
48. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United
States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 232 n.208 (1988). Even the precision that "market
value" requires does not solve all potential ambiguities and problems in actual application to concrete cases. In many circumstances the expropriated property (such as a
long-term concession agreement to extract a particular natural resource) will not have
an identifiable market value, because no true market for such concessions exists to
provide the appropriate reference price. In those cases, the adjudicator will likely enjoy
considerable discretion in determining the particular level of compensation that is adequate.
49. Guzman, supra note 32, at 680.
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and resources" introduced the concept of permanent sovereignty, without defining it, as an "inherent" "right of peoples"
and "recommend [ed] all Member States to refrain from acts, direct or indirect, designed to impede the exercise of the sovereignty of any State over its natural resources. "50
Resolution 626 was followed ten years later by the most important UNGA resolution on permanent sovereignty, Resolution
1803.51 In Article 4, a near-unanimous Assembly, including the
United States, adopted language declaring that investors "shall
be paid appropriate compensation.., in accordance with international law" where their property-including, by inference, their
contract rights-has been taken, and that disputes over compensation "should be made through arbitration or international adjudication" where the investor and state have so agreed.5 2
The use of the word "appropriate" rather than "adequate"
was a semantic though not necessarily substantive concession to
developing countries. The fact that Article 4 stated the standard
as "appropriate . . . in accordance with international law" gave
developed countries ample space to make the highly plausible
argument that Article 4 was fully compatible with the Hull Rule,
as the "appropriate" amount of compensation was "adequate"
compensation, as international law required.53
Just as importantly, Article 3 of Resolution 1803 affirmed
50. G.A. Res. 626 (VII), U.N. Doc. A/2361 (Dec. 21, 1952). The United States
opposed Resolution 626 because it failed to contain any "indication that states which
take private property should recognize the rights of private investors under international law." James N. Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50
AM.J. IN T'L L. 854, 854 (1956).
51. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962). For a discussion of
Resolution 1803's drafting history, see Karol N. Gess, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources: An Analytic Review of the United Nations Declaration and its Genesis, 13 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 398 (1964). For a comprehensive list of permanent sovereignty-related
United Nations General Assembly ("UNGA") resolutions and other U.N. decisions, see
Nico SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DuTIEs app. 1 (1997).
52. G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 51, 1 4 (emphasis added).
53. See Gess, supra note 51, at 427-28 (noting the position of the United States and
Ireland that "'appropriate compensation' could only mean [adequate compensation];
the term 'appropriate' . . . was merely descriptive and had no technical or qualitative
meaning," a position affirmed by Chile, the author of the draft language); Stephen M.
Schwebel, The Story of the UN. 's Declarationon Permanent Sovereignty over NaturalResources,
49 A.B.A. J. 463, 466 (1963); Robin C.A. White, A New InternationalEconomic Order, 24
IN-r'L & COMP. L.Q. 542, 545 (1975) (Resolution 1803 "embodied" the "developed nation's view"). But see Henry Landau, Protection of PrivateForeign Investments in Less Developed Countries-its Realities and Effectiveness, 9 WM. & MARv L. REV. 804, 811-12 (1968)
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that host state promises to investors were legally binding, 54 and
Article 4 articulated the right of investors and host states to
agree to settle compensation disputes through international adjudication. This latter declaration was particularly significant, as
international adjudicators were more likely than the host state's
municipal courts or authorities to take the view that promises to
investors should indeed be upheld, and that "appropriate" compensation for breach was, generally speaking, something approximating full compensation.
Resolution 1803, despite its articulation of an ostensibly prodeveloping-country international legal principle of "permanent
sovereignty," thus represents, as Gess argues,
[A] positive reaffirmation of four basic principles of international law:
1. That compensation must be paid in the event of a lawful
taking of rights and property;
2. That such compensation must be paid in accordance with
international law... ;
3. That investment agreements between States and private
parties have a binding effect;
4. That arbitration agreements between States and private
55
parties have a binding effect.

Guzman argues that these reaffirmations were, in effect,
overturned or superseded by the UNGA's 1974 adoption, over
strong developed country protests, of CERDS. 56 CERDS was the
(suggesting that the developed countries' preferred interpretation of "appropriate" as
"adequate" was not shared by developing countries).
54. Article 3 of G.A. Res. 1803 reads:
In cases where authorization is granted, the capital imported and the earnings
on that capital shall be governed by the terms thereof by the national legislation in
force, and by international law. The profits derived must be shared in the
proportions freely agreed upon, in each case, between the investors and the
recipient State, due care being taken to ensure that there is no impairment,
for any reason, of that State's sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources.
G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 47 (emphasis added); see also Landau, supra note 53, at 81314.
55. Gess, supra note 51, at 448. Gess further summarizes Resolution 1803 as "affirming the rule of pacta sunt servanda." Id. This is not to say that Resolution 1803
contains no important ambiguities. In particular, the resolution never defines "permanent sovereignty." More technically, and as Landau points out, the resolution fails to
clarify the precise relationship between public international law principles that might
govern contractual relations and potentially relevant municipal law. See Landau, supra
note 53, at 813-14.
56. See Guzman, supra note 32, at 650-51; CERDS, supra note 41.
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culmination of developing country efforts to establish a New International Economic Order ("NIEO"). 5 7
For present purposes, the most relevant provision of CERDS
is Article 2, which declares that
Each State has the right.

.

. [t]o nationalize, expropriate, or

transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid . . . taking into ac-

count... all circumstances that the State considers pertinent.
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the
nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful
means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of
States and
in accordance with the principle of free choice of
58
means.

The use of the permissive "should" rather than the obligatory "shall" of Resolution 1803 might suggest that, at least as
CERDS is concerned, "appropriate" compensation for expropriation is not necessarily required in all circumstances. Note that
Article 2 also asserts that the host state "shall" decide what
amount of compensation, if any, is appropriate, and that such
decision shall be made under municipal (and presumably not
international) law applied by municipal courts (and presumably
not by international adjudicators who might be more willing to
hold that promises should be kept, and full compensation paid
when they are not). More generally, CERDS is notable because
its purported scope of application extends to "all . . .wealth,
natural resources, and economic activities. ' 5' The inclusion of
"wealth" and "economic activities" was intended to signal that
permanent sovereignty principles were not only applicable to
the natural resources sector (which had been the explicit and
largely exclusive focus of the permanent sovereignty movement
up to that point), but were also supposedly applicable to eco57. On 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States ("CERDS") as part
of the New International Economic Order ("NIEO"), see generally Gillian White, A New
InternationalEconomic Order?, 16 VA.J. INT'L L. 323 (1976). Other NIEO-related UNGA
resolutions include: G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3202 (May 1, 1974); G.A.
Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (May 1, 1974); G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3171 (Dec. 17, 1973) [hereinafter Permanent Sovereignty].
58. CERDS, supra note 41, art. 2 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
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nomic activities involving foreign investors in all other sectors of
the economy.
In Guzman's view, the NIEO resolutions "thoroughly undercut" the notion that "adequate" compensation must be paid
under international law for expropriation, nationalization, or, by
extension, breaches of state promises to investors.6" As he puts
it,
Essentially, CERDS puts the host country government in full
control and places the investor at the mercy of that government.
•. . [T] he Hull Rule ... was no longer a rule of customary

international law.
• . . The international rules governing . . .investment were

entirely uncertain and individual states were in a position to
determine what constituted appropriate compensation.6 1
For Guzman, the rise of BITs in the 1990s thus suggests a
paradox: after destroying the Hull Rule of adequate compensation in the 1970s, many developing countries were now reaffirming their support for the rule by signing BITs that explicitly provided for the payment of adequate compensation in the event of
expropriation. 62 Guzman explains this arguably paradoxical behavior by reference to cartel theory. In his view, developing
countries succeeded through their U.N. efforts in creating a legal cartel, consisting of no international legal protection for for63
eign investors that collectively benefited developing countries.
As long as most or all developing countries supported the cartel,
foreign investors would have no choice but to invest under unfavorable international legal rules if they chose to invest at all. 64
As with economic cartels, however, members of the U.N. legal
cartel faced incentives to defect from the collective regime by
offering investors, through BITs, guarantees of more favorable
treatment, including guarantees of "adequate" compensation,
because defecting countries might expect to capture a greater
60. Guzman, supra note 32, at 649.
61. Id. at 650-51.
62. See id. at 642. Many but not all BITs guarantee "adequate" compensation for
expropriation; some of the treaties use words such as "just" to describe the requisite
standard. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 10, at 97-118 (describing the typical content

of BITs, including provisions on compensation for expropriation).
63. See Guzman, supra note 32, at 678.
64. See id.
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65
share of available foreign investment.
There are a number of questionable aspects to Guzman's
story. I will briefly mention four before addressing the fifth, the
main focus of the Article.
First, Guzman seems to assume that the Hull Rule was actually incorporated into customary international law, and thus was
available to be destroyed by CERDS. However, incorporation
was and remains a highly contested issue among legal scholars,
many of whom argue quite plausibly that customary international law has never fully reflected the Hull formulation.66 Second, Guzman seems to assume that the various UNGA resolutions, and particularly CERDS, can be said to have created upon
passage meaningfully binding customary international law. But
in fact there is great uncertainty as to the conditions under
which UNGA resolutions may be said to create new, binding international law,6 7 and there are, to my knowledge, no serious
65. See id.
66. Whether a rule of customary law exists is said to depend on whether there is a
widespread state practice in which states act in a certain way out of a sense of legal
obligation (opiniojuris). See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 7
(1990). Much of the debate about whether the Hull Rule currently reflects or ever
reflected customary law has focused on identifying instances of expropriation of foreign-owned property, and analyzing whether the amount of compensation paid, if any,
seems to reflect the "full" value of the investor's loss. Dawson and Weston provide an
early survey of compensation practice, and conclude that the payment of adequate
compensation is "[flar from being a 'rule' of international law" and that "the demand
for... 'adequate' . .. compensation would appear to be little more than a preference
assumed [by investors and their home governments] for bargaining purposes-an element of legal mythology to which spokesmen pay ritualistic tribute and which has little
meaning in effective policy." Dawson & Weston, supra note 46, at 757. Later surveys of
lump-sum settlements of investor-state disputes suggest that the compensation paid is
often less than "full" compensation, though the extent to which these settlements may
be properly viewed as indicative of customary international law remains debated, as
diplomatic settlements may lack the opinio juris said to be required of customary law
formation. See SCHRIJVER, supra note 51, at 192-93; see also Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility
of BilateralInvestment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary InternationalLaw, 14 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 327, 359 (1994) ("The argument that the 'prompt, adequate, and effective formula' is traditional international law finds little support in state practice or authoritative treatises and monographs."). See generally Samuel KB.Asante, International
Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal,37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 588 (1988); Richard B.
Lillich & Burns H. Weston, Comment, Lump Sum Agreements: Their Continuing Contribution to the Law of InternationalClaims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1988).
67. For extensive citations to various participants in the debate over the legally
binding nature of UNGA resolutions, see Robert B. Von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, InternationalArbitrationsBetween States and Foreign PrivateParties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM.J. INT'L L. 476, 524 nn.177-79 (1981). As Schrijver notes, "[i]t is
no longer a source of great controversy that certain categories of U.N. resolutions can
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academic arguments that CERDS might have met those conditions-whatever they may be.6 8 Third, Guzman also ignores the
ambiguous relationship between CERDS and early UNGA permanent sovereignty resolutions, particularly Resolution 1803.
Resolution 1803 was favorably "recalli[ed]" by the UNGA as late
as 1973," no subsequent UNGA resolution expressly claims to
renounce Resolution 1803's pro-investment principles, and it is
not clear that the Charter can or should be read as overturning
whatever international legal effect Resolution 1803 might have
had. And fourth, Guzman overly discounts the tremendous shift
in economic ideology that took place in the developing world in
the two decades between the passage of CERDS and the explosion of interest in BITs in the 1990s-a shift from widespread
acceptance of dependency theory, which emphasized the need
to control foreign investment, to the neo-liberal Washington
Consensus, with its emphasis on removing barriers to investment
and eliminating opportunities for control.7 ° Once we recognize
this ideological shift, the behavior of developing countries in the
two periods becomes much less inherently paradoxical.
But the most troublesome aspect of Guzman's argument,
and the one that is the main focus of this Article, is Guzman's
supporting assertion that by destroying the Hull Rule, developing countries thereby established an international legal regime
have legal effects beyond their status as mere recommendations," and the idea that
UNGA resolutions might at a minimum provide evidence of customary international
law-as opposed to creating it from whole cloth in a quasi-legislative fashion-is widely
accepted. SCHRIJVER, supra note 51, at 372. That said, whether particular UNGA resolutions actually do have "legal effects beyond their status as recommendations" is unclear,
and must be determined on a case-by-case basis using uncertain criteria.
68. The best view of CERDS, and probably the only supportable view, is that it
represented the legal "aspirations" of certain developing countries, rather than embodying new law itself. See A.O. Adede, A Profile of Trends in the State Contractsfor Natural
Resources Development Between African Countries and Foreign Companies, 12 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L.
& POL. 479, 547 (1980) ("These UN resolutions, although not legally binding as such,
are the vehicles through which developing countries have clearly expressed the prevailing attitude of a large section of the international community toward certain aspects of
customary international law... ."); Charles N. Brower &John B. Tepe,Jr., The Charterof
Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of InternationalLaw?, 9 INT'L L.
295, 300-01 (1975). Adede is generally sympathetic to these "attitudes," but he repeatedly emphasizes that the U.N. resolutions "are not binding," but rather provide a
"guide ... to the negotiations of modem contracts .... ." Id. at 567.
5.
69. See Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 57,
70. See generallyJason Webb Yackee, Are BITs Such a Bright Idea? Exploring the IdeationalBasis ofInvestment Treaty Enthusiasm, 12 U.C. DAVIsJ. IN-r'L L. & POL'Y 195 (2005).
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in which they could breach promises to foreign investors with
impunity, and in which they had no means of credibly guaranteeing not to breach their promises with impunity-in other
words, a regime in which the principle of pacta sunt servanda had
no meaningful force, and could not have any meaningful force.
Guzman leaves no doubt as to his argument on this point, and,
as the primary source of the myth, it is worth quoting him at
length:
International law [after CERDS] ... does not provide a way
for a host country to make credible and binding commitments to an investor. The mechanisms for the enforcement
of a contract between a state and a private firm is [sic] at best
extremely weak and at worst altogether non-existent. The
precise status of such contracts is the subject of ongoing debate in the field of public international law and is far from
being settled ....
[T]here is no consensus that a contract
with a host, by itself, offers a firm any additional protections
under international law. Furthermore, even if protections exist in theory, the investor cannot be sure that they will be enforced by an arbitral tribunal or that the host will accept the
decision of a tribunal if the firm obtains a favorable ruling.
The fact that such agreements cannot be relied upon with
any confidence implies that it is not possible for a state, even
if it enters into an agreement, to make its commitment fully
credible.
The protections afforded to contract rights are so uncertain under international law that it is reasonable to model investor behavior under the assumption that these rights are of
little or no value to the investor. More importantly, because
these protections are unreliable, international law does not
allow the host to make credible contractual commitments.
This inability to make credible contractual commitments
under international law explains why the debate over the protections afforded by customary international law was so important. Until the rise of BITs, there were few legal constraints, beyond those provided by customary law, on the behavior of host countries toward foreign investors. Thus, if the
international community concluded that customary law did
not require . . . adequate . . . compensation upon the taking
of property, there7 1would be no way for investors to achieve
these protections.
71. Guzman, supra note 32, at 659-60; see also id. at 678-79.
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The value of BITs, in this view, lies not simply in reestablishing a duty to pay adequate compensation for expropriation, narrowly construed, but primarily in the fact that the treaties "lead
to a world in which contracts between firms and host states are
binding."7 2 The treaties are essential because they "allow investors and hosts to establish binding and enforceable contracts...
by permitting the host state to bind itself to a particular course
of action before the investment takes place."7 3 Indeed, Guzman
claims that after CERDS, BITs were the only way of reestablishing
the ability of developing countries to offer credible guarantees
to investors. As Guzman says, "without BITs ...

it was impossible

for any single country to 'defect' from the [CERDS] agreement-thus the 'cartel' of [least developed countries] was extremely stable."74

As I show in the next Part, these claims are highly misleading. What is important to emphasize at this point is that Guzman's claims, though misleading, have had great impact on the
field of BIT studies. His theory has been accepted, unquestioned, by a number of prominent BIT scholars to support the
notion that BITs are necessary to enable developing countries to
provide investors with credible guarantees, and that investors,
for that reason, care deeply about the treaties and take the presence or absence of BITs decisively into account when deciding
where, and whether, to invest. Thus Neumayer and Spess, in a
widely circulated empirical study of the effects of BITs on aggregate-level flows of foreign investment, rely heavily on Guzman's
theory of BITs to support their finding that countries that sign
BITs can expect to receive huge amounts of additional foreign
investment.7 5 Their empirical finding of huge causal effects
makes sense only if it really is true that, absent BITs developing
countries have no means of providing investors in risky sectors of
the economy with effective guarantees.
Likewise, Ryan Bubb and Susan Rose-Ackerman have recently published a formal model that purports to show that developing countries are in theory collectively better off entering
into BITs; while their model challenges certain aspects of Guz72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 679.
at 687.
at 678.
generally Neumayer & Spess, supra note 36.
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man's own account," it also explicitly adopts Guzman's argument that prior to BITs international law did not admit the enforceability of state promises to investors. As Bubb and RoseAckerman say, "under customary international law, contracts between private investors and states are of dubious enforceability .... [BITs] have emerged to fill this lacuna of international
law by providing [a principle of] pacta sunt servanda.""
The upshot of these various mythic arguments is to suggest
that developing countries that wish to receive foreign investment
have little or no flexibility to reject the BIT regime. If we really
believe that, absent BITs, the investor is necessarily and unavoidably "at the mercy" of the host state government, and that the
host state government can do nothing to credibly guarantee the
investor that its promises will be kept, then any state that wishes
to attract foreign investment would indeed be well-advised to
enter into BITs. But as I show in the next Part, developing countries are perfectly capable of offering credible guarantees to investors on a case-by-case basis, as necessary to attract specific investments, without the need to enter into BITs.
III. PACTA SUNT SERVANDA AND BITS: THE REALITY
In this Part I analyze the long and consistent body of international jurisprudence supporting the idea that state promises
to investors are presumptively enforceable. I first define what I
mean by an international legal principle of pacta sunt servanda. I
then discuss the pre-CERDS cases supporting the principle. I
conclude the Part by discussing the many post-CERDS cases rejecting the notion that CERDS permits host states to breach
their promises to investors. As the Part illustrates, some of the
strongest statements in support of the principle of pacta sunt servanda came out of the great oil arbitrations of the 1970s-the
same time period during which, according to Guzman, interna76. See generally Bubb & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 33. In Guzman's view, BITs
leave developing countries worse off collectively than they were under the CERDS regime. See id. at 292. The main aim of Bubb and Rose-Ackerman's article is to show that
it is possible, given certain assumptions, to model developing countries as collectively
better off with BITs. I take no position here on this particular question.
77. Id. at 291-92. They also assert that "[u]nder traditional international law
[meaning pre-BIT international law], states are the only subjects that can enter into
binding agreements; agreements between non-state entities such as multinational corporations and states are generally not enforceable." Id. at 296 n.13.
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tional law absolutely failed to recognize a duty to compensate
investors for promissory breach. By the late 1970s and early
1980s, it should have been perfectly clear to anyone who cared
to look that, as long as an investor had access to a neutral, authoritative adjudicator, the investor would almost certainly be
awarded meaningful damages in the event that a developing
country breached its promises. CERDS, in other words, very
quickly proved to have absolutely no effect on the willingness of
international tribunals to treat state promises to investors as presumptively enforceable in principle and in practice.
A. Defining Pact Sunt Servanda
As an initial matter it is desirable to specify what I mean by
the principle of pacta sunt servanda.7 8 I do not mean an unduly
rigid and formalistic principle under which states must, in any
and all circumstances, strictly obey to the letter promises they
make to investors no matter what the content of those promises,
no matter how severely circumstances have changed, or no matter what dire effects obeisance might have on the state's operations or existence. 79 As R.Y. Jennings puts it:
It is wrong to suppose that pacta sunt servanda must apply tout
78. The dictionary definition is that "agreements and stipulations... must be observed." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1140 (8th ed. 2004).

Lowenfeld offers a less doctri-

naire and rigid view of the principle as he sees it existing as part of an international lex
mercatoria: "[c] ontracts should prima facie be enforced according to their terms (pacta
sunt servanda)." Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator's View, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 71, 89 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1998) (paraphrasing

Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years, in LIBER AMICORUM
FOR THE RT. HON. LORD WILBERFORCE 149, 174-76 (Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds.,

1987)). Lowenfeld, following Mustill, adds a number of complementary and qualifying
principles, particularly that contracts should be upheld in "good faith," that states
should not be permitted to escape contractual obligations by denying their own capacity to make binding obligations, and that unforeseen difficulties in performance give
rise to a duty upon both parties to negotiate in good faith to modify the contract. Id.
79. In contrast, Asante suggests that pacta sunt servanda means that "agreements
must be kept at all costs." Samuel KB. Asante, The Concept of Stability of ContractualRelations in the TransnationalInvestment Process, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC ORDER 234, 241 (Kamal Hossain ed., 1980). Asante is sympathetic to the
efforts of developing countries to create the NIEO, and it is clear from his discussion
that he advances such a rigid definition of pacta sunt servandalargely to be better able to
reject it as "blind" and simplistic and "lack[ing] of sophisticat[ion]." Id. at 243. In other
words, his definition is a straw man, and as he goes on to note, "[e]qually, a bold assertion of an unqualified sovereign right to unilaterally abrogate or modify [investment
contracts] . . . cannot provide a viable basis for a meaningful economic relationship
between a host government and a transnational corporation." Id.

2009]

PACTA SUNT SERVANDA

1571

court in all cases or in none. No mature law of contract is
absolute, and few principles of law are to be understood without qualification ....
Is it not likely that the true position is
that the principle functions, as it does in the case of treaties,
as a presumption: a presumption leaning against the existence of any right of unilateral termination; but which, like all
presumptions, may in some cases be successfully rebutted?
Thus understood it may be found both to
fit readily into the
80
pattern of existing law and to explain it.

Following Jennings, we can say that a principle of pacta sunt
servanda exists on the international level, if, except in limited

circumstances, neutral and authoritative decision-makers tend to
hold, as a matter of whatever law or laws they find to apply to the
state promises at hand, that those promises should be kept, with
meaningful compensation to be paid to the investor if they are
not.8 l This means that states may on some occasions escape liability for breaching their promises if a relevant defense is determined to be applicable as a matter of law, such as the defense of
"necessity" that has been at the center of a number of recent
investment arbitrations,8 2 or of force majeure,s or that a contract
is void as ultra vires,84 or if fundamental circumstances have

changed in some meaningful way.85 But in practice, there are
80. R.Y.Jennings, State Contracts in InternationalLaw, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 156, 177
(1961).
81. For an example of an international arbitration (involving foreign trade rather
than foreign investment) that nonetheless provides a good illustration of the importance of guaranteeing arbitrator neutrality, see generally Martin Domke, The Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 787 (1959) (criticizing as unfair and impartial an
award rendered against an Israeli company by three Soviet arbitrators in a dispute over
the Soviet seller's contractual obligation to obtain licenses for the export of oil).
82. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability
Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. IATO & INrr'L HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 199, 207 (2008). See generally Jorge E. Vifluales, State of Necessity and Peremptory
Norms in InternationalInvestment Law, 14 LAw. & Bus. REV. Am. 79 (2008).
83. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and NationalSecurity,
40 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 437, 450 n.53 (2008).
84. Cf Emmanuel Gaillard, Introductory Note to France: Court of CassationDecision in
Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. Et Al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 26 I.L.M. 1004, 1004
(1987) (discussing the French court's refusal to enforce an ICC arbitration award
against Egypt on the ground that the government official who signed the contract consenting to arbitration did not have official authority to do so).
85. This, of course, is the principle of rebus sic stantibus, which exists as the yin to
pacta sunt servanda's yang. See ADAM SAMUEL, JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNACOMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A STUDY OF BELGIAN, DUTCH, ENGLISH, FRENCH,
SWEDISH, Swiss, U.S. AND WEST GERtAN LAW 243 (1989) ("Pacta sunt servanda is one of
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the principal rules of the lex mercatoria. It is true that it may be tempered by the
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few examples of the successful invocation of any exceptions to
what has been a consistent and strong presumption that state
promises to investors should be upheld, with meaningful compensation paid if they are not.
This definition of pacta sunt servanda is also flexible enough
to include other legal labels or legal theories that neutral, authoritative decision-makers might use to justify promissory enforcement-equity, estoppel, unjust enrichment, the protection
of acquired rights, and so on-the invocation of which can be
expected to have effects equivalent to the recitation and application of the phrase pacta sunt servanda itself. The importance is
not the citation of any particular magic words, but the application in practice of legal principles, however labeled, that support
the basic notion that promises should be kept.
B. The Pre-CERDS Cases
In the years prior to World War II, it was unusual to find
international tribunals adjudicating disputes between states and
foreign investors. This was because of significant doctrinal
doubt as to whether private parties were properly considered to
be subjects of international law capable of directly bringing
claims before international tribunals,8 6 and because the institutional infrastructure supporting international commercial arbitration more generally was still in its infancy.87 Instead, the legal
institution of diplomatic protection provided the main internaprinciple of rebus sic stantibus, but that is the case, to varying degrees, in most municipal laws."); Hasan S. Zakariya, Changed Circumstances and the Continued Validity of Mineral
Development Contracts, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER,
supra note 79, at 263, 265.
86. Thus the literature on "international arbitration" of the period focuses almost
exclusively on international arbitration as a means of settling disputes between governments, not as a means of settling disputes between governments and private actors. See,
e.g.,
Thomas Willing Balch, "Arbitration" as a Term of InternationalLaw, 15 COLUM. L.
REv. 590, 601 (1915) (defining international arbitration as "International Courts and
International judges chosen to function temporarily so as to pass judgment in the light
of the Law of Nations upon some designated case of difference between two or more
Nations .... ."). See generally Henry S. Fraser, A Sketch of the Histoiy ofInternationalArbitration, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 179 (1926) (reviewing the history of international arbitration,
back to ancient Greece and Rome, as a history of interstate dispute settlement).
87. See generally Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration: Instrument of Private Government, 54 YALE L.J. 36 (1944) (reviewing the growth of international commercial arbitration as the "new and separate law of national and international commercial
groups"); Arthur Nussbaum, Treaties on Commercial Arbitration: A Test ofInternationalPrivate-Law Legislation, 56 HARV. L. REv. 219 (1942).
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tional mechanism for enforcing the investor's legal rights against
the host state,8 and there are a number of examples from this
early period of international tribunals enforcing state contracts
in state-versus-state proceedings.
Thus we have the Aboilard award, in which Haiti was ordered
to pay a substantial indemnity for its breach of a concession
agreement with a French investor;8 9 the 1899 Antioquia Railroad
award, in which a British investor was awarded damages for Colombia's breach of a railway construction contract; 90 the 1900
award in the case of Robert H. May, in which Guatemala was
found to have breached its own railway construction contract;9
the 1897 Ch6ribon Steamship case, in which a tribunal awarded a
large indemnity to France for Chile's non-execution of a con88. See Edwin M. Borchard, Contractual Claims in InternationalLaw, 13 COLUM. L.
457, 457 (1913) (noting that "[d]iplomatic protection is often invoked by citizens
of one country in cases arising out of contracts entered into with.., a foreign government"); cf Alexander P. Fachiri, InternationalLaw and the Property of Aliens, 10 BRIT.Y.B.
INT'L L. 32 (1929) (reviewing the most important international claims against host governments for compensation under international law for expropriation of investor property; all of the cases discussed involve espousal of the claim by the investor's government). For a highly interesting discussion and critique of the institution of espousal (or
diplomatic protection) for foreign investment during the interwar years, see generally
EUGENE STALEY, WAR AND THE PRIVATE INVESTOR: A STUDY IN THE RELATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT (1935).
89. Aboilard, 11 R. INT'L ARB.AWARDS 77 (1905). The tribunal based its award on
the principle of the investor's "legitimate expectations" (attentes lMgitimes), a principle
that continues to inform arbitral jurisprudence under BITs. Id. at 80; see also Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, 6 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 419, 147 (UNCITRAL 2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdAward.pdf
(discussing legitimate expectations as "relat[ing] .. . to a situation where a [state's]
conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or
investment) to act in reliance on said conduct, such that a failure ... to honour those
expectations could cause the investor (or investment) to suffer damages.").
90. See H. LA FONTAINE, PASICRISIE INTERNATIONALE 1794-1900: HISTOIRE DocuMENTAIRE DES ARBITRAGES INTERNATIONAux 544, 551-52 (1902).
91. See PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH
THE ANNUAL MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITrED TO CONGRESS 648 (1902). The
tribunal based its award upon its holding that:
REV.

[t]he law of Guatemala... establishes, like those of all civilized nations of the
earth, that contracts produce reciprocal fights and obligations between the
contracting parties and have the force of law in regard to those parties; that
whoever concludes a contract is bound not only to fulfill it, but also to recoup
or compensate (the other party) for damages and prejudice which result...
and that such compensation includes both the damage suffered and the profits lost.
Id. at 673. This appeal to "civilized" law is echoed in the post-World War II awards
discussed infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
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tract with a French ship owner to transport immigrants; 9 2 or the
Oliva award, arising out of the Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903,
in which the umpire awarded the Italian investor reliance damages for Venezuela's breach of a cemetery concession.9 3 The
1930 award in Shufeldt's Case is another important early example.
The Guatemalan legislature had passed a decree annulling the
U.S. investor's contract to extract chicle gum. The sole arbitrator held that Guatemala had an equitable duty under international law, founded upon the investor's reliance on Guatemala's
earlier recognition of the validity of the contract, to provide indemnification."
The famous Lena Goldfields arbitration of 1930 serves as a
rough marker of the beginning of a new era, in which foreign
investors would have the right and the ability to pursue their international legal claims against foreign governments directly on
92. The Chfribon Steamship case (Chile v. France) is briefly noted in W.

EVANS

DARBY, MODERN PACIFIC SETTLEMENTS INVOLVING THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

63 (1904). Darby indicates that the award was never pub-

lished. See id.
93. Oliva had obtained a concession to construct a large pantheon in a Caracas
cemetery. He was expelled from Venezuela before construction had begun. The umpire held that:
It is not to be inferred . . . that Venezuela has the right, either directly or
indirectly, to break the concession, or that no recovery therefore should be
allowed against it. A nation, like an individual, is bound by its contract, and
although it may possess the power to break it, is obliged to pay the damages
resultant upon its action.
JACKSON H. RALSTON, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF 1903, S. Doc. No. 316, 58th Cong.,
781, 787 (1904). Because Oliva's lost profits from the contract were too speculative to
be accurately determined, the umpire awarded Oliva the "amount expended to obtain"
the concession "plus a reasonable allowance for the time lost by the claimant in connection therewith." Id.
94. See Decision of the Arbitratorin Claim by The United States of America on Behalf of P.
W Shufeldt Against the Republic of Guatemala, 24 Am. J. INT'L L. 799 (1930) [hereinafter
Shufeldt's Case]. The sole arbitrator held that,
The Government of Guatemala having recognized the validity of the contract
for six years and received all the benefits to which they are entitled under the
contract, and allowed the cessionary to go on spending money on the concession, is precluded from now denying its validity ....
It is perfectly competent for the Government to enact any decree and for any
reasons they see fit; but where such a decree, based even on the best of
grounds, works injustice to an alien subject, the Government ought to make
compensation for the injury inflicted, and cannot invoke any municipal law to
justify their refusal to do so.
d. at 800. The arbitrator's reasoning is analogous to the notion of "promissory estoppel" reflected in Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See generally Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissoiy Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991).
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their own behalves. 95 The case involved a British concessionaire's challenge to the Soviet Union's repudiation of a mining
concession that granted Lena "exclusive rights of exploration
and mining over certain vast areas of territory" for up to fifty
years.9 6 The Lena award contains path-breaking statements on
the procedural law of international arbitration, 7 though for us
the important holding is the substantive one, a holding that
Nussbaum characterizes as uninteresting and unworthy of significant comment,9 8 but which, for that unworthiness, is interesting
here: the tribunal found that in repudiating the contract the
Soviet Union had unjustly enriched itself. The tribunal awarded
the company GB-13 million (US$65 million at then-prevailing
exchange rates), an amount which Veeder rightly characterizes
as "enormous" 99 and which implicitly included compensation for
Lena's lost profits, as Lena had only invested US$20 million in
the enterprise.' 0 0
Notably, the Lena tribunal based its decision on "general
principles of law" common across domestic legal systems that es95. See generally Arthur Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd.
and the Soviet Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31 (1950). Lena is not, however, the only
pre-World War II example of a true investor-state international arbitration. In the
1930s the Radio Corporation of America ("RCA") successfully arbitrated breach-of-concession claims against both China and Czechoslovakia. See generally Czechoslovakia v.
Radio Corporation of America, 30 Am. J. INr'L L. 523 (1936); Radio Corporation of
America v. China, id. at 535. In the Czechoslovakia award, the tribunal noted that "in
public law the sentence pacta sunt servandawill also apply,just as public interest requires
stability as regards any arrangement legally agreed upon," and that a state could conceivably repudiate a contract with an investor only upon (the hypothetical) showing
that "public interests of vital importance would suffer if the agreement should be upheld under the rules of ordinary civil law." Id. at 531.
96. See Nussbaum, supra note 91, at 44-45. The Lena award is unpublished, but
Nussbaum provides a partial translation and an important commentary. V.V. Veeder
provides interesting historical detail in The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical
Root of Three Ideas, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 747 (1998). The novelty of an award rendered
by a private citizen, for the benefit of a private citizen, against a sovereign state is illustrated by a contemporaneous article in the newsweekly Time, which, with apparent skepticism, asked, "[wiould Russia obey this order? Could two private citizens successfully
command a Great Power? How did they ever get to thinking that they could?" Millions
for Lena?, TIME, Sept. 15, 1930, at 23, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,788474,00.html.
97. See generally Veeder, supra note 96.
98. Nussbaum, supra note 91, at 41. As Nussbaum says, "[b]reach of contract and
unjust enrichment, bases of the Lena claims, have long been recognized as legitimate
causes of action under the various systems of law, including international law." Id.
99. Veeder, supra note 92, at 748.
100. See Millions for Lena, supra note 92, at 23.
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tablished unjust enrichment as a cause of action, rather than exclusively on Soviet law. 1 °1 This innovation-looking to "general
principles" to support contract enforcement-has proved remarkably influential in international arbitral practice, as it allows
tribunals to cite widespread domestic legal support for the sanctity of contractual obligations in order to justify enforcing state
contracts involving nationalized property.
The pre-war trend of strong arbitral support for pacta sunt
servanda continued to strengthen in the years immediately following World War II. Two cases in particular are worth discussing in detail, though they are concerned exclusively with interpreting the oil concessions at issue and not with any purported
10 2
right of the state to breach them.
In Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. and the Sheikh of

Abu Dhabi (1952), Lord Asquith, acting as sole arbitrator, held
that a petroleum concession granting the company exclusive
rights to search for and exploit petroleum resources in the land
and territorial waters of Abu Dhabi did not extend to Abu
Dhabi's continental shelf.' 3 The award is of scholarly interest
primarily for its discussion of the then-new continental shelf doctrine; for our purposes the main interest is that Lord Asquith's
holding-for the Sheikh and against the investor-presumes
without discussion that the contract is enforceable according to
101. Nussbaum, supra note 91, at 50-51.
102. Two other post-World War II cases are also worth briefly mentioning, as they
suggest how respect for a state's contractual obligations can be convincingly rooted in
basic, foundational principles, such as the principle of "good faith." In the Alsing award
(which involved international trade rather than investment), Greece was alleged to
have breached a long-term contract with a Swedish match company to supply matches
to the Greek government and the government's default on related loan obligations. See
Stephen M. Schwebel, The Alsing Case, 8 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 320 (1959). The award is
notable for the umpire's forceful statement that the contract "is subject to the general
principles of the law of contracts" and "must be interpreted according to the norms of
private law and by the application of the principles of good faith." Id. at 333. In the
event, the umpire ruled in Greece's favor, in part on the match contract's force majeure
clause, id. at 340-41, and in part on a theory of assumption of risk, id. at 344-45. Similarly, in a 1957 award an ad hoc tribunal convened under an arbitration clause in a
1932 contract held that Yugoslavia had a "good faith" duty to compensate a French
railway investor for losses incurred as a result of Yugoslavia's devaluation of its currency.
See Socit6 Europ~ene d'tudes et d'Entreprises v. Yugoslavia, 24 I.L.R. 761, 765-66
(1956).
103. In the Matter of an Arbitration Between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd.
and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, I INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 247, 260 (1952) [hereinafter Abu
Dhabi].
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its written terms, as interpreted in light of "principles rooted in
the good sense and common practice of the generality of
civilised nations-a sort of 'modern law of nature"' rather than
in light of any particular body of municipal law.1" 4 This basic
notion is essentially that which was pioneered by the Lena tribunal-that state contracts with investors could or should be governed, at least in part, by "general principles of law," both to
interpret the particular contract at issue, and to support their
against state claims of a sovereign right to
enforcement
10 5
breach.
Likewise, in Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Company, Ltd., t ° 6 the referee was asked, pursuant to an arbitration
clause in the concession agreement, to decide a question of contract interpretation involving the concession's payment provisions. There was some question as to whether the concession
was valid under Islamic law, which the referee, who was familiar
with Lord Asquith's Abu Dhabi award, 10 7 deftly avoided by finding it inconceivable ("I cannot think . . .") that the Ruler of
Qatar would have intended Islamic law to govern the contract if
the result would be to render the transaction unenforceable. 0 8
Instead, the parties must have intended the contract to be governed by "principles of justice, equity and good conscience,"
principles which rendered the question of contract enforceabil104. Id. at 251.
105. The idea of "general principles of law as recognized by civilized nations" that
can provide a body of law to resolve international disputes is codified in Article 38 of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. See Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, art. 38, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 391; Statute of the International
Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1060 (1945). The Abu Dhabi award's invocation of
general principles was quickly "quoted, with emphatic approval and as representing a
major advance" by many eminent scholars of international law, including Jessup, McNair, and Mann. See FRIEDMANN, supra note 7, at 193 n.14. The resort to general principles of law to decide disputes over international concession agreements was driven in
part by the perceived need to fill lacunae in public international law, which, because of
its development primarily as a tool to resolve diplomatic disputes between states, did
not necessarily contain rules easily applicable to disputes falling outside of public international law's traditional scope of application. As Friedmann observes, international
tribunals strongly resist declining to decide disputes because of a lack of determinable
law (non liquet), and the notion of general principles provides them with a flexible and
effective away around a non liquet disposition. See id. at 189 n.3.
106. 20 I.L.R. 534 (1953).
107. See id. at 544.
108. See id. at 545.
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ity moot.'0 9

By modern standards the Qatar and Abu Dhabi arbitrations,
as well as the concession agreements underlying them, are
rather primitive,110 with contemporaneous commentators unsure as to how the awards should fit into a system of international adjudication that had up to then primarily involved disputes between states rather than between a state and a private
actor. This uncertainty is reflected in Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's
note to the Qatar award, in which he observed that the award "is
not an international arbitration in the accepted meaning," but
had been included in his InternationalLaw Reports anyway "as being of interest for the increasing number of arbitrations between
Governments and private companies and individuals."''
As arbitral decisions dealing with state contracts grew more
common, they also became more sophisticated, building upon
the foundational notions of the Lena award to firmly establish as
a matter of legal practice that state contracts, including their arbitration provisions, were enforceable as a matter of whatever
law was found to be applicable.
The well-known 1958 ARAMCO award is reasonably viewed
as the first truly modern published award that builds upon this
earlier precedent to firmly support the principle of pacta sunt

109. See id.
110. The concessions illustrate the kinds of extremely one-sided concessionary
agreements, entered into under conditions of significant inequality of bargaining
power and covering vast swathes of territory for long periods of time, that the permanent sovereignty movement was primarily aimed at overturning. For example, the
agreement in Abu Dhabi was entered into by an "absolute ...monarch" whose reign was
supported by a British protectorate and who governed his country under a "purely discretionary" and "primitive" system of justice. Abu Dhabi, supra note 99, at 247, 250-51.
The region's inhabitants were "primitive [and] poor" and, until oil was discovered, the
economy "depended mainly" on gathering pearls. Id. at 247. The concession granted a
single organization-Petroleum Development, a consortium of the world's leading oil
companies-exclusive rights to search for, produce, and dispose of petroleum resources across the entire territory for a period of seventy-five years. See id. at 247-49.
This arrangement was renegotiated in the government's favor-and without resort to

nationalization-in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See

MANA SAEED AL-OTA1BA, PETRO-

EMiRATs 45-46 (1977).
111. Ruler of Qatar, 20 I.L.R. at 547. As F.A. Mann suggests, Lauterpacht's hesitancy in publishing the awards seems to reflect his uncertainty as to whether the lex
arbitri (or arbitral law) governing investor-state arbitrations was public international law
or the municipal law of the seat of arbitration or of some other state. See F.A. Mann,
State Contracts and InternationalArbitration, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 8-9 (1967).
LEUM AND THE ECONOMY OF THE UNITED ARAB
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1 12
servanda against a claim of sovereign prerogative to breach.
Saudi Arabia had entered into a long-term concession agreement with a multinational oil consortium that provided, among
other things, for the consortium's exclusive right to transport oil
produced from its concession. 1 3 Some years later, Saudi Arabia
signed a contract with a company run by shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis, providing Onassis with a thirty-year "right of priority" to transport Saudi oil.' 1 4 The basic issue before the tribunal,
which was convened under an arbitration clause in the
ARAMCO concession, was essentially an issue of contract interpretation: did the concession grant ARAMCO the exclusive
transportation rights that were later improperly given to Onassis?l 1 5 But during the proceedings Saudi Arabia raised the more
fundamental argument that, because the contracts underlying
the dispute were "acts accomplished in the exercise of its sovereignty," the arbitral tribunal had no authority to decide the legality of the "consequences of such acts," and that it retained the
sovereign power to regulate oil transportation as it saw fit." 6
The tribunal held that it had jurisdiction to decide the dispute,
as signing the concession contract-which expressly emphasized
"that the Parties intend to respect all their mutual obligations
and that neither of them ever entertained the thought that they
would not be bound"-was itself an "exercise of its sovereignty"
that must be enforced." 7 As the tribunal noted, it could not
"accept the view that questions affecting the exercise of the sovereign rights of a State are, by their nature, incapable of being
the subject matter of arbitration," as a "considerable body of international decisions" indicated that promises to arbitrate disputes with private actors were fully enforceable." 8
The tribunal proceeded to apply the now-familiar "general
112. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R. 117
(1958).
113. Id. at 117-18.
114. Id. at 118.
115. Id. at 145.
116. Id. at 149-50.
117. Id. at 152; see also Alfred Verdross, The Status of ForeignPrivateInterests Stemming
from Economic Development Agreements with Arbitration Clauses, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL
FOUNDATION, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW CENTER, SELECTED READINGS ON
PROTECTION By LAW OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 117, 130 (1964) ("[A] sovereign
power, lacking that capacity [to bind itself by contract], is inconceivable, the competence to bind itself being the very essence of sovereignty.").

118. Saudi Arabia, 27 I.L.R. at 152.
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principles of law" (citing the Lena award) to the substance of the
dispute, though it primarily relied on the text of the contract as
the appropriate "fundamental law" to be applied.' 1 9 And here
the tribunal provided a powerful statement in support of the
principle that state contracts were binding, a statement that
would generate numerous echoes in later arbitral jurisprudence:
The Tribunal holds that the Concession has the nature of a
constitution which has the effect of conferring acquired
rights on the contracting Parties. By reason of its very sovereignty within its territorial domain, the State possesses the legal power to grant rights which it forbids itself to withdraw
before the end of the Concession .... Nothing can prevent a
State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, from binding itself
irrevocably by the provisions of a concession and from granting to the concessionaire irretractable rights .

.

.

. [The

1 20
breach of such rights will] engag[e] its responsibility.

The ARAMCO award powerfully illustrated that arbitral
tribunals were very likely to accept jurisdiction over disputes involving host states and foreign investors-despite claims of "sovereignty"-and to hold that state contracts were binding-again,
despite claims of "sovereignty." The award also confirmed the
willingness of tribunals to look beyond the host state's municipal
law to identify contract-supporting rules, either by applying "general principles" or by applying "international law" as such, especially where the contract at issue contained a choice of law clause
indicating the applicability of such sources of law. George Ray,
ARAMCO's general counsel, well-stated the award's implication
as supporting the "centuries" old and "generally accepted principles" of "ad hoc contract and pacta sunt servanda."''
The modern trend toward arbitral enforcement of state
contracts was further confirmed by the 1963 award in Sapphire
International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company
("NIOC").' 22 A small Canadian petroleum company had entered

into a joint venture arrangement with NIOC in which the Canadian company promised to invest US$18 million in petroleum
exploration and development in exchange for a twenty-five per119. Id. at 168.
120. Id.
121. George W. Ray, Jr., Some Reasons for the Binding Force of Development Contracts
Between States and Foreign Nationals, 16 Bus. LAw. 942, 943 (1961).
122. 35 I.L.R. 136 (1963).
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cent stake in any profits realized over the twenty-five year duration of the concession.1 23 The relationship ran into immediate
trouble, with NIOC and the Iranian government raising numerous unfounded complaints about Sapphire's performance. After
attempts by Sapphire to work out these differences, the company
initiated ad hoc arbitration in accord with Article 41 of the contract. 1 24 The Iranian government refused to participate in the
proceedings,1 25 and the sole arbitrator issued a thoroughly reasoned award in Sapphire's favor, finding that Iran had breached
its obligation, expressly laid out in the contract but also independently recognized as a "general principle [ ] of law, based upon
reason and upon the common practice of civilized countries," to6
12
act in "good faith and good will" in its dealings with Sapphire.
On the issue of whether state promises to investors should be
recognized as binding, with breaches subject to a duty to compensate, the sole arbitrator left no doubts: "it is a fundamental
principle of law, which is constantly being proclaimed by international courts, that contractual undertakings must be
respected. The rule pacta sunt servanda is the basis of every contractual relationship. 12 7
Iran's breach meant that Sapphire was entitled to damages,
"the object [of which] is to place the party ... in the same pecuniary position that they would have been in if the contract had
been performed in the manner provided for by the parties at the
time of its conclusion."' 2' This rule of expectation damages was
"simply a direct deduction from the principle of pacta sunt servanda, since its only effect is to substitute a pecuniary obligation
for the obligation which was promised but not performed."' 29
This meant that Sapphire was entitled to "the expenses incurred
in performing the contract" and the "net profit which the contract would have produced."' 3 ° Because the ultimate profitability of the concession was highly uncertain, the Sole Arbitrator
decided the compensation issue ex aequo et bono, awarding Sap123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

139; id. at 189 (the duration of the concession).
161.
164.
172-73, 179, 181.
181.
185-86.
186.
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phire a total of just over US$2.6 million on Sapphire's US$600
thousand reliance loss.13 1
The ARAMCO and Sapphire awards appear to be only the
most visible of a potentially substantial body of pre-CERDS arbitral decisions enforcing state contracts. Unfortunately the precise details of these cases are not publicly known, but they seem
clearly to support Jean-Flavien Lalive's 1964 observation that "it
is a fact that the desire of [legal] security of the foreign company
or investor will be met, to a certain extent at least, by the inser1 32
tion of an arbitration provision" into the investment contract.
Many of these arbitrations took place under the auspices of the
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), a private and
well-respected arbitral institution headquartered in Paris. ICC
131. Id. at 189-90.
132. Jean-Flavien Lalive, Contracts Between a State or a State Agency and a Foreign Company, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 987, 991 (1964). Maurice Bourquin, writing four years
earlier, also shared Lalive's view of the utility of arbitration for securing the performance of state "economic development agreements" with foreign investors. See Maurice
Bourquin, Arbitration and Economic Development Agreements, 15 Bus. LAW. 860 (1960), reprinted in SELECTED READINGS ON PROTECTION BY LAW OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
99, 109 (Southwestern Legal Foundation ed., 1964) (referring to arbitration as the
"key" to the system of guaranteeing the "execution of agreements" with investors).
Lalive's qualification ("to a certain degree at least") refers to the possibility that arbitration would prove to be no more "flexible," no less "costly," and no "quicker than the
normal judicial process." Lalive, supra, at 991. Lalive also mentions the potential problem of award enforcement. Id. This latter problem has been largely solved by the widespread adoption of the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New
York Convention]; see Susan Choi, JudicialEnforcement of Arbitration Awards under the ICSID and New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 175 (1996). Developing
countries also recognized the effectiveness of international arbitration at supporting
the enforceability of their promises to foreign investors-hence Saudi Arabia's passage
in 1963 of a law, in reaction to the ARAMCO award, forbidding government instrumentalities from entering into arbitration agreements with foreign investors, and Algeria's
"lack of confidence in international arbitration" in post-independence era-as did investors and their legal advisors. ABDUL HAMID EL-AHDAB, ARBITRATION WITH THE ARAB
COUNTRIES 78, 77-8 & 561 (1999); see also Fred C. Pedersen, Expropriationin International
Law: Strategies of Avoidance and Redress, 10 U. TOL. L. REv. 73, 122 (1978) ("the investor
should endeavor to reach an accord with the host state on the settlement of disputes,
for instance on arbitration (possibly under rules of the ICC in Paris). This would
greatly ease the burden on the investor in the event of an expropriation (by avoiding
the necessity for numerous suits by the investor either to recoup the debt or to encourage settlement) and it might actually deter expropriation since the host state would
be almost assured that it would be held liable for some amount of compensation.");
Thomas Wdlde, Negotiatingfor Dispute Settlement in TransnationalMineral Contracts: Current Practice, Trends, and an Evaluationfrom the Host County's Perspective, 7 DEN'v. J. INr'L
L. & POL'v 33, 56 (1977) (noting the utility of arbitration clauses for investors).
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arbitrations are confidential unless the parties to a dispute decide otherwise. But in a 1965 survey of ICC practice, Karl-Heinz
B6kstiegel noted that "many contracts between states and private
firms" contained ICC arbitration clauses, 133 and that, since the
first state contract dispute was submitted to the ICC in 1922, "a
whole series" of state-contract cases had actually been submitted
to the ICC for resolution, with almost all states complying with
The lesson that B6kstiegel draws is that
the resulting awards.'
the ICC's success at resolving state contract disputes "can be regarded as providing further evidence for the thesis that the principle of 'pacta sunt servanda' of international law today applies
not only to agreements between states, but also to contracts between states and private enterprises."'3 5
B. The Libyan Trilogy
B6kstiegel's conclusion is further supported by a number of
arbitral decisions issued contemporaneously with and just after
the UNGA's adoption of CERDS, as some host states began to
more boldly challenge the notion that their contracts with foreign investors were binding. The most influential of these
awards arose out of high-profile nationalizations of petroleum
concessions in Kuwait and Libya. These great oil arbitrations
forcefully demonstrated the utility of international arbitration
for resolving foreign investment disputes, and for resolving them
consistently in the foreign investor's favor. Indeed, Yves Dezalay
and Bryant Garth credit these arbitrations with promoting the
133. Karl-Heinz B6kstiegel, Arbitrationof Disputes between States and PrivateEnterprises
in the International Chamberof Commerce, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 579, 580 (1965). See generally
EL-AHDAB, supra note 128 (discussing a 1985 study of Algeria's contacting practice that
found a reference to ICC arbitration in ten out of seventeen state contracts).
134. See B6kstiegel, supra note 129, at 581, 583. As Yves Derains, then Secretary of
the ICC's Court of Arbitration, noted in his 1973 article, by that time it had become
widely accepted as a matter of international commercial custom ("usages") that states
could bind themselves to arbitrate disputes with private parties. Yves Derains, Le Statut
des Usages du Commerce International Devant les Juridictions Arbitrales (A la lumiire de
l'exporience de la Chambre de Commerce Internationale) [InternationalCommercial Custom before
Arbitral Tribunals (In Light of the Experience of the InternationalChamber of Commerce)], 1973
REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 122, 144-45 (1973) (Fr.). Derains cites as an example ICC Case
1939, which involved a claim by an Italian company against an African state organization. Id. The tribunal held that the "international public order is forcefully opposed" to
the idea that a state entity could rely on an arbitration clause to induce the private
party's contractual reliance, and then could, when a dispute arose, seek to claim its own
promise to arbitrate to be void as a matter of municipal law. Id.
135. See B6kstiegel, supra note 129, at 586.
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dramatic growth of the ICC's international arbitration business,
as investors came increasingly to realize the great value of removing international commercial disputes from the reach of domestic legal regimes."3 6
The Libyan trilogy-three awards, each issued by a different
sole arbitrator, interpreting nearly identical contracts in regard
to nearly identical sets of facts and arriving at similar holdings in
favor of the foreign investors-provide unimpeachable evidence
that state contracts with investors remained meaningfully enforceable despite the permanent sovereignty resolutions. 37 Indeed, the awards illustrate that the UNGA resolutions had no
impact on the willingness of international tribunals to enforce

136. YvEs DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 75, 83-

85, 101 (1998). As the authors note, "[t]he petroleum disputes were founding acts.
They made arbitration known and recognized." Id. at 75. One of the consequences of
this greater recognition was an increased reliance by investors on lawyers to draft and
negotiate complex contracts. See id. at 92; see also John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter,
InternationalLaw and Institutionsfor a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 543 (1993) (describing
the Libyan oil arbitrations as demonstrating the efficacy of the New York Convention at
encouraging state parties to settle investment disputes). More generally, the Libyan
trilogy of cases, like the earlier ARAMCO and Lena awards, provided subsequent tribunals with a powerful source of persuasive precedent in favor of a robust principle of
pacta sunt servanda. See Catharine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the InternationalArbitrator,20
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 957, 1000-01 (2005) (describing how arbitral decisions can become
"transformed into ... substantive rule [s]" as awards are "reported, elaborated and then
incorporated ... into the literature," thereby "forming non-binding but highly persuasive rules to guide future tribunals."); see also Elf Aquitaine Iran v. National Iranian Oil
Co., 11 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 97, 101 (1986) (citing the Lena and ARAMCO awards for the
position that "[a] State 'is bound by its obligations under international agreements and
concessions' in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda," and holding that
Iran could not escape a contractual arbitration clause by unilaterally canceling the underlying concession).
137. Wlde and Ndi make the curious argument that two of the three Libyan oil
cases "cast doubt[ ] on the extent to which" arbitrators would enforce contractual "stabilization clauses," in which the host state promises not to unilaterally change legislation or regulations in ways which harm the investor's interests. Wdlde & Ndi, supra note
9, at 246. It is true that the LIAMCO award, cited infra note 135, and the TOPCO award,
cited infra note 137, contain language supporting the position, as Walde and Ndi put it,
that "stabilization clauses cannot prevent a unilateral change of terms and conditions by
the government." Wdlde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 246. However, and as discussed later in
this section, both awards forcefully make the point that unilateral changes, even if not
legally prevented, will give rise to a right to meaningful compensation for the breach.
For this reason, the two awards cannot reasonably be read as evidence of international
legal uncertainty over the general enforceability of state promises to investors, as
Wdelde and Ndi's article might be read to imply.
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state promises, even at the height of the permanent sovereignty
movement.
The awards involved claims by the Libyan American Oil
Company ("the LIAMCO award"),138 the British Petroleum
("BP") Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd. ("the BP award"), 1 "9
and the Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company ("the TOPCO
award")1 4 ° against the Libyan government for breaches of the
companies' concession contracts. The Libyan government had
nationalized the companies' assets and repudiated the associated
contracts, providing no compensation. The repudiations were
in apparent violation of so-called "stabilization" clauses in each
of the contracts, and through which Libya had expressly promised not to change the legal framework in ways adverse to the
investors' interests.1 4 1 The concessions contained arbitration
clauses, which the companies invoked. Libya refused to participate in the proceedings, sending a letter to the President of the
International Court of Justice, who, under the arbitration
clauses, was empowered to nominate sole arbitrators. In the letter Libya invoked notions of permanent sovereignty to claim that
the legitimacy of the nationalizations could only be addressed by
its own tribunals.1 4 2 That Libya refused to present such arguments to the tribunals themselves suggests that it had little confidence that the arbitrators would find the arguments persuasive.
And indeed they did not. 143 The common point of all three
awards is a ringing endorsement of the principle of pacta sunt
138. Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Gov't of the Libyan Arab Republic, April 12, 1977, 20
I.L.M. 1 (1981) [hereinafter LJAMCO Award].
139. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Gov't of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53
I.L.R. 297 (1979) [hereinafter BPAward]. For a good discussion of the background of
the case, see generally Joel M. Fisher, Albert Golbert, & Bahram Maghame, British Petroleum v. Libya: A Preliminary ComparativeAnalysis of the InternationalOil Companies'Response
to Nationalization, 7 Sw. U. L. REv. 68 (1975).
140. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Gov't of the Libyan Arab Republic,Jan. 19, 1977, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978) [hereinafter TOPCO Award]. The
original French award is published at 104JouRNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 350 (1976)
(Fr.). For a helpful commentary, see Jean-Flavien Lalive, Un grand arbitragep~trolierentre
un gouvernement et deux societds privies etrangres [The Great Oil arbitrationBetween a Government and Two Foreign Private Corporations], 104 JOURNAL Ou DROIT INTERNATIONAL 320
(1976) (Fr.).
141. LIAMCO Award, 20 I.L.M. at 22-23.
142. Id. at 78.
143. See BPAward, 53 I.L.R. at 297; LIAMCO Award, 20 I.L.M. at 1-2; TOPCOAward,
17 I.L.M. at 25-29.
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servanda, and it is worth quoting the most relevant passages at
length.
In the BP award, Sole Arbitrator Lagergren needed but one
paragraph to establish that under the law applicable to the contract-by a choice of law clause common to all of the concessions the relevant law was "the principles of law of Libya common to the principles of international law and in the absence of
such common principles then by and in accordance with the
general principles of law, including such of those principles as
may have been applied by international tribunals" 14 4-the nationalization was clearly a breach of contract requiring compensation. In Lagergren's view,
No elaborate reasons are required [to justify enforcing the
contract. The [nationalization]] constitute [s] a fundamental
breach of the BP Concession as they amount to a total repudiation of the agreement and the obligations of the Respondent [Libya] thereunder, and, on the basis of rules of applicable systems of law too elementary and voluminous to require
or permit citation, the Tribunal so holds. Further, the taking
by [Libya] ...clearly violates public international law... .145
Given the breach, BP was entitled to damages, which Lagergren would determine at a later proceeding.' 4 6 Before that proceeding, however, BP and Libya reached a settlement agreement
in which BP was paid "an immediate cash payment of approxi147
mately [GB]£17.4 million sterling."
The other two Libyan awards-LIAMCO and TOPCO-take
Libya's invocation of sovereignty more seriously, analyzing at relative length whether the UNGA permanent sovereignty resolutions might have some relevance to the disputes. Sole Arbitrator
Ren-Jean Dupuy's discussion in the TOPCO award remains the
most extensive rejection of CERDS' international legal significance. In Dupuy's view, the ability of states to make binding
commitments to investors was an attribute of, rather than an affront to, state's sovereignty: "the State, by entering into an international agreement with any partner whatsoever, exercises its
sovereignty whenever the State is not subject to duress and
144.
145.
146.
147.

BP Award, 53 I.L.R. at 303.
Id. at 329.
See id. at 357.
Id. at 298.
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where the State has freely committed itself through an untainted
consent."' 4 8 This basic principle was supported both by Libyan
and Koranic law and by international law and practice, and was
reflected in UNGA Resolution 1803, which, as Dupuy notes, explicitly provides that "foreign investment agreements ... shall be
observed in good faith."' 4 9 The result, Dupuy holds, is that:
a State cannot invoke its sovereignty to disregard commitments freely undertaken through the exercise of this same
sovereignty and cannot, through measures belonging to its internal order, make null and void the rights of the contracting
party which
has performed its various obligations under the
50
contract.1
This is true in spite of CERDS Article 2, which for Dupuy
lacks any legally binding force both because of the lack of support for CERDS by developed countries 15 ' and because CERDS
Article 2 is inconsistent with "general practice of relations between States with respect to investments" which recognizes the
investors' rights to compensation for breach of contract and the
ability of states and investors to submit their investment disputes
for final resolution by international tribunals.1 5 2 Furthermoreand this is Dupuy's final nail in the CERDS coffin-CERDS itself
supports the enforcement of investment contracts by explicitly
recognizing that "international obligations" should be fulfilled
in "good faith."' 15 ' Dupuy's sole fillip to the permanent sovereignty movement is his view that permanent sovereignty-which
Dupuy accepts as a principle that has been "continuously . . .
affirmed by the United Nations" 15 4 -simply means that a state
cannot by contract permanently alienate its sovereignty over natu148. TOPCO Award, 17 I.L.M. at 23-24.
149. Id. at 24.
150. Id. at 23-24.
151. Id. at 29.
152. Id. at 30-31.
153. Id. at 31.
154. Id. at 26. Dupuy's position that permanent sovereignty over natural resources
is a widely accepted principle of international law is undoubtedly correct, at least at a
superficial level. As Schrijver notes, the principle, "despite its complicated genesis has
achieved a firm status in international law and is now a widely accepted and recognized
principle of international law," SCHRIJVER, supra note 51, at 377. Though what, in practice, it actually means is still uncertain. Dupuy's application was exceptionally (but reasonably and, in retrospect, probably not all that surprisingly) narrow-permanent sovereignty is not, Dupuy says, a jus cogens norm that trumps a state's other international
obligations, including the obligation to honor contracts in good faith.
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ral resources. But where, as with the Libyan concessions, the
contracts represented merely a "limitation, partial and limited in
time, of the exercise of sovereignty," this should be viewed as a
fully enforceable exercise of the state's sovereign prerogative to
15 5
enter binding commitments.
Dupuy's conclusion is a commonsensical tour de force in
support of the continuing vitality of the principle of pacta sunt
servanda, and one totally at odds with Guzman's description of
the post-CERDS legal landscape:
good faith.., has an important place even in [CERDS]. One
should conclude that a sovereign State which nationalizes
cannot disregard the commitments undertaken by the contracting State: to decide otherwise would in fact recognize
that all contractual commitments undertaken by a State have
been undertaken under a purely permissive condition on its
part and are therefore lacking of any legal force and any
binding effect. From the point of view of its advisability, such
a solution would gravely harm the credibility of States since it
would mean that contracts signed by them did not bind them;
it would introduce in such contracts a fundamental imbalance because in these contracts only one party-the party
contracting with the State-would be bound. In law, such an
outcome would go directly against the most elementary principles of 6 good faith and for this reason it cannot be ac5
cepted.'
Dupuy awarded the investor restitutio in integrum15 7-akin

to

a right to demand specific performance, a decision which simply
encouraged Libya to negotiate with the investor a voluntary settlement of US$152 million in Libyan crude oil.1 58
155. TOPCO Award, 17 I.L.M. at 26.
156. Id. at 31.
157. Id. at 36.
158. See Libya to Compensate Two US. Companies, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 26, 1977, at 59.
Much of the academic commentary on the Libyan trilogy has focused on the contrasting remedial outcomes, comparing in particular Dupuy's willingness to grant restitutio in
integrum with the insistence of the TOPCO and LIAMCO tribunals that damages, and
not specific performance, was the appropriate remedy. Compare Robin C. A. White, The
Expropriation of the Libyan Oil Concessions: Two Conflicting InternationalArbitrations, 30
INr'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (1981) (arguing in favor of damages rather than restitution), and
A.A. Fatourous, InternationalLaw and the Internationalized Contract, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 134
(1980), with Von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 67, at 533-45 (arguing in favor of
Dupuy's award of specific performance). Von Mehren and Kourides also argue convincingly that the different outcomes were largely due to different litigation strategies
by the claimants.
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The LIAMCO Award makes many of the same points. First,
states are free to use choice of law clauses to apply international
law to govern their relationships with investors. 159 Second, general principles of law, including Libyan law "form a compendium of legal precepts and maxims, universally accepted in theory and practice," supporting "the principle of sanctity of property and contracts. . . [and] the obligation of compensation in
cases of expropriation.""60 Third, it is "widely accepted in international law" that arbitration provisions in contracts are enforceable despite the repudiation of the contract as part of a nationalization.' 6 1 Lastly, the "sanctity of contracts" or the "right to conclude contracts is one of the primordial civil rights
acknowledged since olden times" and is a "fundamental right"
reflected in Libyan law, Islamic law, and in the UNGA permanent sovereignty resolutions themselves, including CERDS,
through the duty to fulfill international obligations in good
62
faith.1
The only aspect of the Libyan trilogy that would seem to
provide any support whatsoever for Guzman's theory that
CERDS destroyed the principle of pacta sunt servanda is the
LIAMCO Award's discussion on the issue of damages. And this
would be a very weak reed on which to base the theory. The
precise issue was whether the investor's lost future profits should
necessarily be factored into the award's quantum. Sole arbitrator Sobhi Mahmassani viewed the Hull Rule's "adequate" standard as rigidly and always requiring lost profits. In his view, it
was doubtful whether the Hull Rule was ever actually reflected in
international custom-not an insupportable view, incidentally.1 63 For Mahmassani, it appeared that the question of automatically including future lost profits was "controversial" with
"substantial divergences of view,"1 64 such that the Hull Rule-if
it meant that lost profits were always required-was now a "tech159. LIAMCO Award, Apr. 12, 1977, 20 I.L.M. 1, 64 (1981).
160. Id. at 72.
161. Id. at 77.
162. Id. at 105-10. On pacta sunt servanda as a primordial principle, see Hans
Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 775, 775 (1959) ("Few rules for the
ordering of society have such a deep moral and religious influence as the principle of
the sanctity of contracts: Pacta sunt seruanda.").
163. For citations to the debate over whether the Hull Rule was part of customary
international law, see supra note 66.
164. LIAMCO Award, 20 I.L.M. at 131-32.
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nical rule for the assessment of compensation, a useful guide...
stand[ing] only as a maximum ..

.

.""

He concluded that

where the nationalization that had led to the breach of contract
was "lawful" in the sense of being non-discriminatory and for a
public purpose, as he found to be the case here, the question of
including lost profits should be analyzed using the language of
"equity" rather than of "adequacy." The importance of the semantic shift should not be exaggerated; developed countries
themselves had referred to the proper standard under interna1 66
tional law as one of "equitable" compensation.
More importantly, in application, "equity" meant that
LIAMCO was entitled to lost profits where those profits were reasonably certain. Mahmassani accordingly awarded the company
approximately US$80 million, an amount reflecting an estimate
of lost future profits for one concession area but not for another,
where profitability was less certain. 6 7 The LIAMCO tribunal's
award is thus readily compatible in outcome with later awards
purporting to apply the Hull Rule's "adequate" standard of compensation. However, it also suggests that lost profits should not
be awarded where profitability is too speculative.1 6 In fact, the
sole arbitrator in Shufeldt's Case held that where a state violates
its equitable duty to honor its contractual obligations, damages
are "always recoverable" but that lost profits "must be the direct
69
fruit of the contract and not be too speculative and remote."'
C. The Aminoil Award
The central message of the Libyan trilogy is that the princi165. Id. at 143.
166. See SCHRIJVER, supra note 51, at 60 (quoting Sweden's observation during the
negotiations over UNGA Resolution 1803 that the proposed resolution should not negate the host state's duty under international law to pay "equitable compensation" for
nationalized property).
167. LIAMCO Award, 20 I.L.M. at 171.
168. See, e.g., Biloune v. Ghana Investments Centre, 95 I.L.R. 183, 228 (1990)
(awarding a Syrian investor restitution of his investment in a hotel project, where
Ghana had breached the investment contract and expropriated the investment).
169. Shufeldt's Case, supra note 90, at 819. It is difficult to understand Judge Higgins' reading of the LIAMCO award as holding that the "equitable" standard of compensation meant "claims based on [lost profits] were in effect excluded." ROSALYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 14243 (1994). Sole
arbitrator Mahmassani is careful to state that lost profits might indeed be awarded
under an "equitable" standard, and indeed, as I noted above, he awards them for the
loss of one of LIAMCO's concessions.
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ple of pacta sunt servanda was quite alive and well even in the
period immediately following the CERDS resolution. That same
basic message was reaffirmed in a number of other international
arbitrations of the period. The most important of these is undoubtedly the 1982 Aminoil award, 7 ' which has been called the
"most significant arbitral contribution ... to the law of state contracts and state responsibility for those contracts" of the postCERDS period.' 7 1 It remains a remarkable example of subtle,
sophisticated, and pragmatic international jurisprudence, notable in part for its application of a relational theory of contract
under which it found that the original written terms of the oil
concession had been implicitly, and in some instances explicitly
supplemented and modified over the years by the company's repeated capitulations to Kuwait's demands for a different relationship more favorable to Kuwait. 17 2 The facts underlying the
dispute are quite complex, 7 3 but essentially Aminoil alleged that
Kuwait's 1977 nationalization of its oil concession was in breach
of a 1948 concession agreement, formally modified and supplemented in 1961 and informally modified again in 1973.17' The
agreement contained a stabilization clause in which Kuwait
promised not to change the concession's legal regime absent
Aminoil's consent.1 75 The basic questions addressed by the tribunal were whether, in light of this clause and the parties' relationship as a whole, Kuwait was legally prevented from nationalizing the concession (the tribunal held that it was not); and
whether, in any event, Kuwait owed Aminoil compensation for
170. Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982) [hereinafter
Aminoil].
171. Pierre-Yves Tschanz, The Contributions of the Aminoil Award to the Law of State
Contracts, 18 INT'L L. 245, 246 (1984); see also Fernando R. Tes6n, State Contracts and Oil
Expropriations: The Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration,24 VA. J. INT'L L. 323, 358 (1984) (describing the award as a "major contribution" that "[r] ight or wrong is deserving of respect").
172. In departing from the black letter of the original contractual documents to
construe the parties' actual and evolving expectations, the Aminoil award shares certain
affinities with Macneil's influential relational theory of contracts, though the Aminoil
tribunal does not cite his scholarship. For a journal-length review of Macneil's theory
and its influence, see Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions A
Symposium in Honor of Ian R. Macneil: Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U.L.
REv. 737 (2000).
173. For helpful summaries, see generally Tschanz, supra note 167 and Tes6n,
supra note 167.
174. See Aminoil, 21 I.L.M. at 979; see also Tschanz, supra note 167, at 246.
175. See Aminoil, 21 I.L.M. at 990-91; see also Tschanz, supra note 167, at 247; Tes6n,
supra note 167, at 325.
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the taking. 17 6 In what was becoming a familiar practice, the tribunal purported to apply a mixture of Kuwaiti and international
law, including general principles of law, to rule largely in Aminoil's favor. Of particular interest is that the tribunal easily and
laconically dismissed Kuwait's invocation of the permanent sovereignty resolutions. It found that Kuwait's argument that,
permanent sovereignty over natural resources has become an
imperative rule of jus cogens prohibiting states from affording
by contract or by treaty, guarantees of any kind against the
exercise of the public authority in regard to all matters relat17 7
ing to natural riches [ . . . ] lacks all substance.

Furthermore, the tribunal recognized the principle of pacta
'
sunt servanda as "fundamental,"178
holding that Kuwait was obligated to compensate Aminoil for the nationalization, and that
compensation must be "appropriate" as required by UNGA Resolution 1803.179 To determine the appropriate amount required
taking into account "all the circumstances relevant to . . . the

case, '' 80 and including in particular Aminoil's "legitimate expectations."'' The end result was an award in Aminoil's favor of
over US$179 million, an amount which the tribunal meant to
reflect Aminoil's lost future profits based on the company's expectation of making a "reasonable rate of interest" with inflation."' The Aminoil award presents numerous subtleties and
points of potential criticism,1" but the basic lesson to be taken is
both clear and fully consistent with earlier awards, and particu176. See Aminoil, 21 I.L.M. at 1979-80; Tes6n, supra note 167, at 336, 350-52.
177. Aminoil, 21 I.L.M. at 1021.
178. Aminoil, 21 I.L.M. at 1023. The tribunal's characterization of pacta sunt servanda as "fundamental" is similar to the sentiments of one of Dezalay and Garth's
sources, who, discussing the Libyan cases, noted that "the point we [as advocates for the
application of general principles of law] were making really was whatever system of law
you take, you can pick out a few really basic norms. For instance, murder is wrong,
contracts are to be honored rather than breached, you know." DEZALAY & GARTH, supra
note 132, at 88 n.53. Or, as Goldman puts it, international arbitrators tend to view pacta
sunt servanda as part of the lex mercatoriasaid to govern international commercial relationships as a sort of natural law, separate and apart from any municipal legal system.
Berthold Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law-the Lex Mercatoria, in
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 125 (Julian Lew ed., 1986).
179. Aminoil, 21 I.L.M. at 1033.
180. Id. at 1033.
181. Id. at 1041.
182. Id. at 1042.
183. For example, in his separate opinion to the award, Sir Fitzmaurice criticized
the conclusion that the stabilization clause did not make the nationalization unlawful.
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larly with the Libyan trilogy: notions of permanent sovereignty
do not allow states to abrogate contracts with investors without
paying meaningful compensation that will, under many circumstances, include some allowance for the investor's lost future
profits.
D. Other Post-CERDS Cases
Two other awards from the period immediately post-dating
CERDS are worth discussing in some detail. In the 1979 award
in the case of AGIP Company v. Popular Republic of the Congo,"8 4
AGIP initiated arbitration under the arbitration clause in an oil
products distribution contract that the state had repudiated as
part of nationalization." 5 The tribunal declared the Congolese
government in breach of numerous clauses in the agreement. 8 6
Most importantly, the tribunal easily held that the nationalization breached the contract's "stabilization clause" in which the
government had promised not to apply "any subsequent law or
decree that aims to alter the Company's status,"18' 7 both under
Congolese law (which reflected the French Civil Code) 8 8 and
under international law,"8 9 which applied along with Congolese
law under the contract's choice of law clause.19 ° The tribunal
recognized that "there can nowadays be no doubt concerning
the right of a state to nationalize" foreign-owned property,1 9 1 but
forcefully rejected the notion that this right, or the host state's
"sovereignty," meant that a promise not to change the legal regime could thus be breached without consequence. 19 2 The
binding force of the contract flowed "from the common will of
the parties expressed at the level of [the] international juridical
order," the contract was "freely accepted by the government,"
Id. at 1051. Though in truth it is not clear that a finding of unlawfulness would have
meaningfully impacted the quantum awarded to Aminoil.
184. AGIP Co. v. Popular Republic of the Congo (1979), translated and reprinted in
21 I.L.M. 726 (1982).
185. See id. at 731.
186. See id. at 732-33.
187. See id. at 734.
188. Id. at 734.
189. Id. at 735.
190. Article 15 of the contract provided that the applicable law was "Congolese
law, supplemented if necessary by any principle of international law." Id. at 731.
191. Id. at 735.
192. See generally id.
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and "concluding an international agreement with a private individual" was an exercise of "sovereign power" rather than a limitation of it. 19 3 With no discussion of the UNGA permanent sovereignty resolutions, the tribunal held that "full compensation"
was owed to the Italian company, as the nationalization was "not
just an act of nationalization but also a series of repudiations by
the Government of its contractual undertakings."1 9' 4 And "full"
compensation meant "both the loss suffered (damnum emergens)
and the loss of profits (lucrum cessans). " t 9
The tribunal in the 1982 award of Company Z (Republic of
Xanadu) v. State OrganizationABC (Republic of Utopia), makes the
same points, albeit more extensively and even more
powerfully.' 9 6 The award was published without revealing the
parties' names, though from the text of the award it appears that
Utopia was a francophone African state. Utopia had repudiated
a natural resources agreement and sought to avoid arbitration
(and liability for the repudiation) by claiming that its repudiation was an act of sovereignty over natural resource; Utopia cited
1 97
CERDS in support of its position.
As to the tribunal's jurisdiction (and the arbitrability of the
dispute), the tribunal noted that it was:
superfluous to add that a general principle, universally recog193. Id. at 735-36.
194. Id. at 737.
195. Id. The literature and jurisprudence on the quantum of compensation due
for nationalizations or expropriations typically addresses the issue in terms of the concepts of damnum emergens and lucrum cessans, where the first is generally understood to
indicate the value of the taken property absent any consideration of lost profits or consequential damages, and the latter indicates lost profits. See C.F. Amerasinghe, Some
Aspects of the Quantum of Compensation Payable upon Expropriation, 87 Aro. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 459, 478 (1993). Or as Nouvel describes the distinction, damnum emergens represents "toutes les d~penses qu'elle a faites en pure perte dans l'accomplissement de ses
obligations contractuelles (damnum emergens) et, d'autre part, tous les blen~fices que
l'excution r(gulire du contrat lui aurait rapport~s (lucrum cessans)." Yves Nouvel,
L indemnisation d'une expropriationindirecte [Damagesfor IndirectExpropriation],5 FORUM DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 198, 199 (2003)
(Fr.). However articulated, the damnum
emergens/lucrum cessans distinction fits uneasily into the "reliance versus expectation
damages" framework familiar to students of United States contract law, though an
award of damnum emergens plus lucrum cessans would be equivalent, in theory, to an
award of full expectation damages. As Nouvel notes, the modern tendency of international tribunals is to award lost profits only where the expropriated property is a "going
concern" whose future profitability has been adequately demonstrated. Id. at 200.
196. Company Z (Republic of Xanadu) v. State Organization ABC (Republic of
Utopia), 8 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 94 (1983).
197. Id. at 108, 111-15.
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nized nowadays ... would in any case prohibit the Utopian
State . . . to repudiate the undertakings to arbitrate which it
made itself.... The position of contemporary positive law of
international relations is that a Government bound by an arbitration clause.., cannot validly free itself of this obligation
its
by an act of its own will, such as for example a change in
19 8
internal law or by unilateral termination of the contract.
Indeed, for the tribunal to pronounce on the remedial consequences of the repudiation in no way entailed an improper
challenge to the state's sovereign right to change its policies as it
saw fit, as the tribunal did not claim the power to order specific
performance, just the payment of compensation equivalent to
performance.' 9 9
As to the sovereign state's ability to enter into binding contracts more generally, here too the law was clear:
It cannot be maintained... that the Utopian State, by virtue
of its national sovereignty, is unable to validly undertake obliTo deny . . . the faculty to validly bind itself
gations ....
would clearly entail an unacceptable limitation of its sovereignty.
the right of the Utopian State to change course and to
...
abandon the policy previously adopted... although indisputable, clearly does not imply that non-performance of the contract must have no consequence, for example, of a financial
nature or, which is more or less the same thing, that the consequences would exclusively depend on the unilateral and
sovereign appreciation of the Utopian Government, and
would thus escape arbitration. Such a theory would be incompatible with the fundamental principle of the binding
force of undertakings freely concluded (pacta sunt servanda) ......0
Citing Dupuy's award in TOPCO, the tribunal went on to
reject Utopia's argument that CERDS had any binding effect to
the contrary and, like Dupuy, emphasized that CERDS expressly
recognized the duty to perform international obligations in
198. Id. at 109.
199. Id. at 113. The Company Z award concerned jurisdiction, not the merits of the
dispute, and it is not known how the dispute was ultimately resolved. However, the
jurisdictional award leaves little doubt that the tribunal would have held that the substantive elements of the contract were binding and that damages were owed.
200. Id. at 113-14.
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good faith.20 t
Numerous other contemporaneous awards affirm (or more
simply apply without comment) the basic lessons of the awards
discussed above. In the interest of brevity and the reader's patience, I will relegate these additional examples, not cited previ2
ously, to the footnotes.

02

201. Id. at 115.
202. See, e.g.,
Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/
1 (Award), 24 I.L.M. 1022 (1985).
[T]he principle pacta sunt servanda is a principle of international law ....
Contracts as a principle of ordering rests on the proposition that individuals
and legal entities make, for their own accounts and on their own responsibility
significant decisions respecting resource utilization and allocation. The form
of order which a society seeks to achieve by accepting that institution of contract thus depends upon the recognition that, in principle, pacta sunt servanda.
It follows that the binding force of contractual duties for parties to a contract
or agreement is recognized in every legal order that utilizes the institution of
contract.
Id.; Amco Asia Corp. v. Rep. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1 (Decision onjurisdiction), 23 I.L.M. 351 (1983) ("[T]he application of the fundamental principle pacta
sunt servanda, a principle common, indeed, to all systems of internal law and to international law" meant that the contractual agreement to arbitrate was enforceable). For
examples of ICSID award, see Liberian E. Timber Corp. (LETCO) v. Republic of Liberia, 26 I.L.M. 647 (1987) [hereinafter LETCO] (awarding the foreign investor damages,
including lost profits, for Liberia's breach of a concession agreement); Benvenuti et
Bonfant v. People's Republic of the Congo, 21 I.L.M. 740 (1982) (awarding an Italian
investor in a bottled-water factory lost profits where the state had breached the contract
and seized the investor's property); Petrola Hellas v. The Greek State, ICC Award of
Apr. 22, 1978, excerpted in 11 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 105 (1986) (enforcing a contractual provision that prevented Greece from imposing a "one-time extraordinary tax" on a foreign
investor, and noting that when a state "unilaterally cancel[s] its contractual obligations
... damages would indeed have to be made good ... on the strength of the principles
of good faith"); ICC Case No. 2321 (1974), 1 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 133, 135 (1976). ICC
Case No. 2321 rejected the state party's argument that its sovereignty meant that it
could not validly bind itself by contract to arbitrate the particular dispute and noting
that:
I have found some difficulties to follow a line of reasoning that a State, just
because of its supreme position and qualities, should be unable to give a binding promise. The principle of pacta sunt servanda is generally acknowledged in
international law and it is difficult to see any reason why it should not apply
here. A sovereign State must be sovereign enough to make a binding promise[.]
ICC Case No. 2321 (1974), 1 Y.B. COMM. ARB.at 135; see also Revere Copper & Brass Inc.
v. OPIC, 56 I.L.R. 258, 284 (1978) (finding that a mining concession contract was binding as a matter of international law even thoughJamaica's legislature had constitutional
power to pass legislation that abrogated certain provisions). Revere is an arbitration
between a U.S. foreign investor and the U.S. government-sponsored investment insurance agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), and concerned
whether OPIC was liable under the insurance policy to indemnify Revere for damages
resulting from Jamaica's interference with Revere's concession. The award is helpfully
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IV. EXPLAINING PACTA SUNT SERVANDA 'S RESILIENCY
Why did the permanent sovereignty movement fail to
weaken the principle of pacta sunt seruanda? Part of the reason
undoubtedly relates to the ambiguity of CERDS' language and
its inconsistency with and ambiguous relationship to the language of the various other permanent sovereignty resolutions of
the era.20 3 The uncertain law-making status of UNGA resolu-

tions undoubtedly was also a factor as well. Given the choice
between applying CERDS, in all of its extravagance and controversy, as mandatory, non-derogable "law," versus applying some
other law-Resolution 1803, for example, or "general principles
of law," or principles of "good faith,"-it is no real surprise that
sober-minded tribunals would chose to invoke the latter and not
the former.2 °4
Arbitral tribunals, staffed for the most part by highly accomplished Western (or Western-educated) lawyers inherently sympathetic to their own jurisdiction and to the notion of pacta sunt
seroanda as a foundational principle of all modern legal systems,
had little trouble determining that the state promises should
readily be upheld.20 5 For example, the idea that states were
somehow forbidden by custom (or by CERDS) to allow neutrals
to decide investment disputes never gained traction in part because its application to developing countries with no real history
analyzed in, David D. Doy, Jr., Arbitration of Economic Development Agreements: The Impact
of Revere v. OPIC, 20 VA.J. INT'L L. 861 (1980).
203. As Judge Higgins observes:
[N]o two [UNGA] resolutions which form the stream of source materials that
make up the concept [of permanent sovereignty] say the same thing. Some do
require compensation, some do not. Some do refer to international legal standards, some do not. Some do make reference to binding obligations, some do
not.
HIGGINS, supra note 165, at 141-42.
204. See LETCO, 26 I.L.M. at 665 (addressing the possibility that Liberia's expropriation of the concession might be justified as a "nationalization," the tribunal cited Resolution 1803, and not CERDS, as the "generally accepted statement of international law"
on the question of nationalizations).
205. Cf DELAZAY & GARTH, supra note 132, at 18-30 (arguing that the international
commercial arbitration system reproduces itself in part by privileging the selection of
arbitrators who share a common acculturation and whose training and socialization
ensure their support for the system). To make a related but somewhat more cynical
point, we can observe that international arbitrators had tangible (e.g., pecuniary) incentives both to find they had jurisdiction to decide investor-state disputes and to resolve those disputes in ways that would encourage investors to continue to insist on
including arbitration clauses in their investment contracts.

1598

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:1550

of an independentjudiciary is so at odds with the axiomatic principle of nemo iudex in sua causa-the notion that a party to a legal
dispute should not be allowed to authoritatively adjudicate that
dispute 2°6-and in part because it conflicted with longstanding
state practice of inserting international arbitration clauses in foreign investment contracts.

20 7

Indeed, even if we assume that

CERDS was "binding" international law, CERDS itself left arbitrators plenty of room to hold in favor of their own jurisdiction, as
CERDS implicitly provided that host states could resolve disputes
with investors by arbitration where the choice of arbitration had
been "freely" made.2 °8
The idea that promises could be broken with impunity was
one that could easily be dismissed not only on doctrinal grounds
as inimical to Resolution 1803, to fundamental principles of law
common to most if not all municipal legal and moral systems,
and even to CERDS' own declaration that international obliga206. Cf FRiEDMANN, supra note 7, at 196 (characterizing the principle of nemo iudex
as a "general principle[ ] of law applicable to international legal relations"); see also
Socit6 des Grands Travaux de Marseille v. East Pakistan Indus. Dev. Corp., ICC Case
No. 1803 (1972), excerpted in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974-1985, at 40, 44
(Sigvard Jarvin &Yves Derains eds., 1990). This award rejected an attempt by Pakistan's
president to retroactively annul by presidential order an ongoing arbitration between a
French company and a Pakistani state-owned company, and to prospectively void any
resulting award, as:
wholly repugnant to . . .natural justice, fair dealing, and the standards of
morality binding upon sovereign Governments. The notion that a debt
should become void and indeed nonexistent ab initio for no better reason than
that the debtor has chosen to put it in dispute is an extreme example of what
natural justice abhors-the person or the public authority setting itself up as
judge of its own cause.
Socit6 des Grands Travaux de Marseille v. East Pakistan Indus. Dev. Corp., ICC Case
No. 1803 (1972), excerpted in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974-1985, supra, at
40, 44.
207. As Ray noted in his comments on the ARAMCO arbitration, the claim that
sovereignty made investment disputes inherently non-arbitrable was "obvious nonsense.
No sacrifice is made. Arbitration of this sort in truth involves only a sound and statesmanlike exercise of sovereignty-not to control the result, not to cast doubt upon its
legitimacy but to share with the other party in an impartial, objective judgment." Ray,
supra note 117, at 947. Indeed, the capacity of states, or of state entities, to irrevocably
commit themselves to arbitrate disputes with private parties has long been viewed as "a
substantive rule of private international law the observance of which is obligatory." Jan
Paulsson, May a State Invoke its InternalLaw to Repudiate Consent to InternationalCommercial
Arbitration?, 2 ARB. INT'L 90, 95 (1986).
208. CERDS, supra note 56, art. 2(c) (noting that nationalization disputes could be
settled by "other peaceful means.., in accordance with the principle of free choice of
means.").
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tions should be upheld in good faith, but also on pragmatic
grounds as inimical to the economic development that developsovering countries so keenly desired and that the permanent
20 9
eignty movement, at heart, aimed to promote.
Even more important, though, was the fact that by the time
the permanent sovereignty movement reached its apogee in the
1970s, the era of the classical natural resources concession, imposed upon colonial or quasi-colonial dependencies for excessively long periods of time and on wildly uneven terms, was already dead and gone. 2 1 The fundamental (and most sympathetic) goal of the movement was always to give
newly-independent developing countries the freedom to walk
away from what some might reasonably describe as odious or
even immoral legacy agreements. 21 In some cases, these legacy
209. See Ray, supra note 117, at 945, 957 (noting that the main justification for
recognizing investment contacts as legally binding is that they promote "pragmatic collaboration" that allows "economic progress"); Wehberg, supra note 158, at 786.
Wehberg states:
the principle of sanctity of contracts is an essential condition of the life of any
social community. The life of the international community is based not only
on relations between states, but also . . . on the relations between states and
No economic relations betweens states and foreign
foreign corporations ....
corporations can exist without the principle of Pacta sunt servanda. This has
never been disputed in practice.
Wehberg, supra note 158, at 786; Bourquin, supra note 128, at 104 ("It is not suggested
that the State could openly violate its written engagements [as a virtue of its sovereignty]. Such a thesis would be manifestly inadmissible, since it would deprive the contract of all value concerning the obligation of the state.").
210. By the 1970s, investors and host states in the most politically sensitive sectors
were entering into new forms of cooperative arrangements that sought to promote stability through contractual flexibility. Thus investment contracts were of significantly
shorter duration than concession agreements of old, and often contained formal provisions allowing for contractual adjustment in the event of changed circumstances. See
Abdullah Al Faruque, Renegotiation and Adaptation of Petroleum Contracts: The Quest for
Equilibrium and Stability, 9J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 113 (2008) (discussing the use of
renegotiation and adaptation clauses); Thomas W. Wfide, Revision of TransnationalInvestment Agreements: ContractualFlexibility in Natural Resources Development, 10 LAw. AM.
265, 279 (1978) ("In response to these developments and developing countries demands in negotiations, agreements with [investors] in natural resources provide for an
increasingly shorter period of time."). Other important changes included the increasing use of "service contracts" and other arrangements allowing for greater host government participation and control over the management of the venture. See generally
Adede, supra note 68 (comparing provisions in traditional and modern concession contracts); J. Evans Attwell, Changing Relationships between Host Countries and International
Petroleum Companies, 17 Hous. L. REv. 1015 (1980).
211. The essential issue at stake in the permanent sovereignty movement was
whether newly independent states should "have a right to start with a clean slate (tabula
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contracts readily appear to be excessively onerous, and it is difficult to imagine a morally convincing argument that a fragile,
newly-independent state should be obliged as a matter of international legal principle to live up to them.2 12 The difficult task
facing developed and developing countries alike as decolonization unfolded was crafting a principled reason why some
promises to investors should not necessarily be rigidly enforced,
while others should generally be enforced. That task was made
largely unnecessary, as investors and their home governments allowed developing countries to escape facially unjust contractual
arrangements out of a sense of political and economic realism,
so that by the late 1960s and early 1970s the most troublesome
colonial-era arrangements had already been unwound through

rasa) and to be released from obligations entered into by the former colonial powers."
supra note 51, at 5. It was, in other words, to modernize contractually-based
relations, not to destroy the institution of contract. Modern scholars make similar arguments that developing countries should be relieved of the obligation to repay "odious
debts"-that is, debts incurred and squandered or stolen by corrupt regimes. See generally Lee C. Buchheit et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007).
212. Zambia offers a good example of the history and content of the most problematic of these colonial-era obligations. Upon independence, the country was saddled
with investment concessions dating to Cecil Rhodes' adventures in the region. According to Peter Slinn, Rhodes:
[S]en[t] agents north of the Zambezi to make "treaties" with local African
rulers and thus to forestall foreign rivals pressing into the area from the north,
east, and west. In June 1890, one of these agents, Frank Lochner, obtained
the first in a series of concessions from Lewanika, the Lozi ruler who dominated the upper Zambezi area. This agreement was "to be considered in the
light of a treaty" between the Lozi (or Barotse) people and the Government of
Queen Victoria, although it was on the Chartered Company's [BSAC's] behalf
that Lochner agreed to protect Lewanika and pay him a subsidy. In return
Lewanika granted to the Chartered Company sweeping commercial concessions including "the sole absolute and exclusive and perpetual right and
power... over the whole of the territory of the Barotse nation, or any future
extension thereof including all subject and dependent territories.., to search
for, dig, win and keep diamonds, gold, coal, oil, and all other precious stones,
minerals or substances.
Peter Slinn, The Legacy of the British South Africa Company: The Historical Background, in
ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE AND ZAMBIAN COPPER: A CASE STUDY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
23, 24 (Mark Bostock & Charles Harvey eds., 1972) (internal citations omitted). As
Zambia moved toward independence, the United Kingdom initially claimed that the
principle ofpacta sunt seruanda meant that the contracts should remain in force. But by
the early 1940s, "[o]fficial feeling now tended toward the view that it was wholly inconsistent with modern notions of development that private companies should extract
from colonial territories large sums that were not the fruits of industrial enterprise but
of ancient concession agreements with unknowing local rulers." Id. at 40-41.
SCHRIJVER,
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renegotiation. 21 ' By the time of CERDS, existing investment
contracts were much more clearly not the product of colonial
imposition or of radically unfair advantage-taking by overbearing
investors.
In short, what the permanent sovereignty movement was capable of achieving was already achieved by the time of the great
oil arbitrations, and what it was capable of achieving was in any
case very modest-limited at most, as Judge Rosalyn Higgins
says, to the idea that:
[i]f, in their infancy as independent states, [developing countries] assumed obligations out of all line with commercial realities, and if such arrangements were made for very long periods of time, tribunals look sympathetically at ways to liberate
the state from the disadvantageous contract.2" 4
And even this is probably an overstatement of the movement's achievements, as actual examples of international tribunals "look[ing] sympathetically at ways to liberate the state" from
its "disadvantageous contracts" are few and far between. Indeed,
Judge Higgins goes on to note that the great oil arbitrations solidified the notion that "nationalizations do require compensation [and] [t] he concept of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources does not leave a state free to ignore contracts it has
voluntarily entered into."2" 5
V. SUMMARY AND RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
In his 1961 commentary on the ARAMCO award, George
Ray, ARAMCO's general counsel, argued that it was:
apparent that the ad hoc law of contract and pacta sunt servanda came into being initially and have endured throughout
the centuries for sound reasons. During these times when
the absolutists are endeavoring to establish state dictation as
mankind's only rule of life, development agreements and
these enduring principles-principles which have withstood
the ravages of attack and time-furnish ample reason for us
to believe that good faith performance of contractual obliga213. Cf. Wlde, supra note 206, at 274 ("Few major contracts ever survive unaffected under the initial conditions until their stipulated termination. Major nationalizations appear in times of high political conflict and visibility, but most changes in the
'rules of the game' come about by less visible renegotiations.") (citations omitted).

214.

HIGGINS,

215. Id.

supra note 165, at 14142.

1602

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:1550

tions will find16 support, now and hereafter, under a worldwide
2
rule of law.
In the preceding Parts, and in the spirit of the truism that
an ounce of fact is worth a pound of theory, I have shown that
Ray's prediction was, in fact, correct. A "worldwide rule of law"
continued to support the principle of "good faith performance
of contractual obligations" despite the "ravages of attack" that
CERDS may have represented.2 1 7 Indeed, the strongest and
most meaningful and authoritative statements in support of the
principle came at the height of the NIEO movement, and well
before the explosion in popularity of BITs in the 1990s.
We can extract five main summary points from the discussion: (1) across the entire post-war era, arbitral tribunals have
consistently and reliably recognized their jurisdiction to decide
disputes over a host state's contractual obligations to foreign investors; (2) those tribunals have consistently and reliably looked
outside of the host state's domestic legal system, when necessary,
to identify applicable contract-supporting legal rules; 2 18 (3)
whether purporting to apply municipal law, general principles of
law, or international law, tribunals routinely state strong support
for the principle of pacta sunt servanda; (4) in applying that principle, arbitral tribunals will reliably award meaningful compensa216. Ray, supra note 117, at 958.
217. I say "may" because it seems clear that many developing countries would not
have supported a version of CERDS that explicitly sought to establish an international
legal regime in which state promises to investors were meaningless, as many, if not
most, developing countries continued to actively seek foreign investment throughout
the 1970s, and they undoubtedly recognized that a world without pact sunt servanda
would likely cause needed investment flows to collapse. Cf Robert 0. Keohane & Van
Doorn Ooms, World Politics and InternationalEconomics: The MultinationalFirm and International Regulation, 29 INT'L ORG. 169, 170 (1975) ("Almost every government in the
world . . . attempts to entice foreign capital."). It is also instructive to note that in the
first investment dispute to be registered with ICSID, the Holiday Inns case, Morocco
affirmed from the beginning of proceedings in the early 1970s that it was in principle
bound by the investment contract at issue, and was in principle bound to arbitrate contract disputes, an indication that at least some developing countries were not so anxious
to declare pacta sunt servanda to be dead. See Pierre Lalive, The First 'World Bank 'Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco)-Some Legal Problems, 51 BRIT. Y.B. I,-'L L. 123, 151
(1980).
218. As judge Higgins summarizes the line of cases discussed above, "the study of
arbitral practice tells us this: whether there is only a domestic-law-proper clause; or
whether there is a 'mixed' international-law and domestic-law clause (as in the Libyan
arbitrations or in Article 42) [of the ICSID Convention], international arbitrators are
very likely to find international law relevant." HIGGINS, supra note 165, at 141.
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tion, at the maximum roughly equating to the investor's nonspeculative expectation loss, and at a minimum roughly equating
with the investor's reliance loss; (5) this willingness to support
state promises to investors has not depended on the presence of
BITs.
The awards that illustrate these points are not hidden away
in dusty and inaccessible archives. They are publicly available
and should be familiar to doctrinally-oriented scholars and to
practitioners of international investment law, even if they are
largely ignored by the international legal scholars of a more social scientific bent whose mythic explanation (and justification)
for BITs I have challenged here. Nor have I cherry-picked
awards that support my argument; the awards discussed are the
most important and most cited awards addressing pacta sunt servanda's applicability to investment contracts, and there are, to
my knowledge, no awards or other decisions by international
tribunals supporting Guzman's theory that CERDS allowed developing countries to breach contracts with impunity.2 19
I conclude this Part with four caveats, designed to clarify the
limits of my argument and to articulate and respond to potential
objections. First, I do not mean to claim that there are no outstanding doctrinal uncertainties whatsoever about important aspects of the enforcement of state promises. Indeed, a number of
important issues remain unsettled in theory and in practice.
They include the circumstances under which lost profits should
be awarded (perhaps not incidentally, this issue is also unsettled
as a matter of municipal contract law and of international commercial law more generally) ,221 the precise effect of long-term
"stabilization clauses," whereby a state promises the investor not
219. This is not to say that investors never lose contract-based international arbitra-

tions; they occasionally do. See, e.g., National Oil Corp. (Libya) v. Libyan Sun Oil Co.
(U.S.A.), ICC Case No. 4462/AS (1985), 29 I.L.M. 567, 600 (1990) (rejecting the investor's defense of force majeure in a state action against the investor for breach of contract); Wintershall A.G., et al. v. Gov't of Qatar, 28 I.L.M. 798, 803-04 (Ad Hoc Arbitral
Tribunal 1989) (holding that, as a matter of pure contract interpretation, Qatar was not
in breach of its obligations under a petroleum exploration and production sharing
agreement); Imperial Ethiopian Gov't v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1976) (enforcing an arbitral award in favor of Ethiopia, where the arbitrators had held
that Ethiopia's repudiation of a natural resources concession was justified by the investor's prior breach). The point is that investors do not lose these cases because of some
supposed right of host states to breach their contractual obligations with impunity.
220. See John Y. Gotanda, Recovering Lost Profits in InternationalDisputes, 36 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 61 (2004).
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to change its laws or regulations for an extended period of
time, 2 2 and the liability of governments for breaches of contracts by state enterprises that are formally separate from the
government. 222 There is also the perennial and perhaps insoluble academic debate over whether at least certain kinds of state
contracts should in principle be governed exclusively by host
state law.2 23 The international law and international practice
governing state promises to investors remain creatures in continuous development and refinement, and any litigated case will
undoubtedly give rise to a multitude of legal and factual ambiguities and uncertainties. Nonetheless, it is beyond any doubt that
state promises to investors are, and have long been, strongly presumptively enforceable, with a duty to meaningfully compensate
in the event of breach. For investors to benefit from this wellestablished presumption, all they need to do is to ensure that
any disputes over the state's performance of its promissory obligations are adjudicated by neutral, authoritative decision-mak221. See, e.g., Wdlde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 247 (describing the uncertainty as one
of whether the breach of a stabilization clause will give rise to a "special right of compensation" beyond the amount of compensation due for a breach of a contract that
does not contain a stabilization clause). But this uncertainty is a far cry from the notion
that international law does not recognize state promises as essentially and meaningfully
binding, and analysts should be careful not to confuse the issue of the enforceability of
long-term stability clauses in the natural resources sector with the more basic and settled issue of the general enforceability of investment contracts. To do so is a bit like
arguing that the hesitancy of municipal courts to strictly enforce certain long-term employment contracts (with their implications of indentured servitude or slavery) means
that municipal courts do not meaningfully enforce employment contracts more generally.
222. On the potential problem of enforcing arbitration clauses in contracts with
state enterprises against the government (a problem that might be described as "reverse
veil-piercing"), see generally KARL-HEINZ BOCKSTIEGEL, ARBITRATION AND STATE ENTERPRISES (1984).

223. This is the debate over the "internationalization" of investment contracts. For
a recent discussion, see A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EUR.J. INT'L L. 309 (2001). But it has
been clear at least since Mann's early articles on the subject (and the awards discussed
above very clearly indicate) that where the contract at issue does in fact contain a
choice of law clause indicating that the tribunal should apply general principles of law,
or international law, or otherwise contains some indication of party intent to apply such
principles, then tribunals will almost certainly, and without much discussion or controversy, proceed to do so. See generally F.A. Mann, The Law Governing State Contracts, 21
BIuT. Y.B. INT'L L. 11 (1944); F.A. Mann, The ProperLaw of Contracts Concluded by International Persons, 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34 (1959); F.A. Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INr'L L. 572 (1960). See generally Lalive, supra note 129; Landau,
supra note 53, at 814. This respect for party autonomy as to choice of law is also embedded in the ICSID Convention, supra note 15, art. 42.
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ers-international arbitrators-whose jurisdiction and awards
on the merits are reliably recognized and supported by international law and practice.22 4
Second, I do not mean to say that BITs do not support the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. Rather, as noted above, they do
explicitly reaffirm it through "umbrella" clauses that repeat the
mantra that states should honor promises made to investors,
though it bears emphasizing that reaffirming is not the same as
reestablishing. 2 2 BITs also indirectly support pacta sunt servanda
by imposing a duty to pay "adequate" compensation for expropriation, and by otherwise committing host states to treat investors "fairly and equitably." As the analysis above suggests, however, this support is largely (if not entirely) unnecessary, and in
some cases BITs can actually complicate pacta sunt servanda principles by interfering with or overriding contract-based dispute
settlement procedures.2 2 6
Third, I do not mean to deny that there are occasional statements in the academic literature, especially in the years immediately surrounding the passage of CERDS, suggesting that the
Hull Rule's standard of adequate compensation for expropriation had at least partially given way to some new standard that
might in limited circumstances provide the investor with some224. The New York Convention, supra note 128, and ICSID Convention, supra
note 15, provide the main formal international legal support for the international arbitration of foreign investment disputes. See generally Choi, supra note 128. It is important
to recognize that BITs are in no way necessary to enable investors to arbitrate contractbased disputes with foreign governments, even before ICSID. To access ICSID, all that
the investor needs to do is insert an ICSID arbitration clause in his contract with the
host state; there is no need for the host state to have first consented to ICSID arbitration through an investment treaty.
225. As Schwarzenberger notes in his commentary on the 1959 Abs-Shawcross
Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, which provided a highly influential model
for subsequent BITs, the "sanctity of undertakings" provision in the draft-the draft's
version of the umbrella clause-was redundant to or "declaratory of customary international law" because the bad faith breach of an investment contract was a already a "contravention of the minimum standard of international law." Schwarzenberger, supra note
47, at 160.
226. See, e.g., Yuval Shany, Contracts Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts between ICSID Decisions on MultisourcedInvestment Claims, 99 AM. J. Irr'LL. 835, 848 (2005);
see also Walid Ben Hamida, L'arbitrageEtat-investisseurface d un desordre procddural: la
concurrence des procddures et les conflits dejuridictions [ArbitrationBetween States and Investors
Faces Procedural Confusion: Competing Procedures and Conflicting Jurisdictions], ANNUARE
Fnt.N cIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 564 (2005) (Fr.) (discussing the "procedural confusion [dsordre]" caused by the overlap between investment treaties and investment contracts).
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thing less than what the Hull Rule arguably would require. But
serious academic statements in support of the permanent sovereignty movement are in fact quite modest in their claims, especially as to the central issue of the vitality of pacta sunt servanda.
For example, Rainer Geiger presents perhaps the most important and widely cited academic defense of a flexible principle
of pacta sunt servanda that would allow states to escape from contractual obligations in certain situations.2 27

However, Geiger's

article does little more than advocate analogizing a loosely defined, but presumably narrow, subset of state contracts that he
calls "economic development agreements" to the contrat administratif of French civil law. According to Geiger's proposal, states
could breach economic development agreements subject to an
obligation to pay damages for "actual losses," or damnum
emergens, but with no obligation to pay damages for lost profits,
or lucrum cessans.2 28

Geiger's position is not that far off from the international
practice, represented by the cases discussed above, which recognizes the abstract right of states to nationalize investor property,
including by breaching contracts, subject to a right to pay compensation..2 29 The main difference is Geiger's assertion that lost
profits should never be awarded. Yet, Geiger's position on that
by
point has never been accepted by international tribunals23 0 or 231
other scholars sympathetic to the contrat administratifanalogy.

227. Rainer Geiger, The Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements, 23
Comp. L.Q. 73 (1974).
228. Id. at 103.
229. Id. at 102-03.
230. One of the few examples of a tribunal sympathetic to the contrat administratif
analogy is found in ICC Award No. 1526 of 1968, excerpted in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974-1985, at 218 (SigvardJarvin & Yves Derains eds., 1990). The arbitrator found that a Belgian investor's concession contract with State X resembled an "an
administrative concession," that State X had the right to unilaterally terminate it, but
that that right must entail the payment of damages plus interest, including lost profits.
Id. at 220-21. Of particular interest is that the tribunal found it to be beyond doubt that
a concession granted in the form of a bilateral contract [contrat synallagnatique] is always subject, even implicitly, to an obligation of damages with interest in the case of
early termination [retrait avant terme], and that the doctrine and jurisprudence are in
this regard without ambiguity. Id. at 220; see also Yves Derains, Commentary, Sentence
rendue dans l'affaire no. 1526 en 1968 [ Verdict Rendered in Case No. 1526 in 1968], JOURNAL
Du DROIT IN'ERNATIONAL 915 (1974) (Fr.).
231. For example, Friedmann also argues for a contrat administratifconception of
investment contracts, under which developing countries might have some inalienable
right to unilaterally amend or rescind at least some kinds of contractual arrangements
INT'L &
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Nor does Geiger claim that his proposal accurately represents
actual international practice, and he explicitly recognizes that
"[1]egal guarantees 'are ... indispensable for the protection of
foreign investment. "232
Other commentary by prominent academics sympathetic to
the permanent sovereignty movement is similarly modest in its
claims as to what the movement was realistically capable of
achieving or what it actually achieved. Chowdhury views CERDS
as, at best, establishing only an "emerging norm" supporting the
idea that compensation for nationalization is to be determined
on equitable principles based on a balancing of "all the circumstances of each particular situation. ' 23 3 Asante suggests that the
NIEO movement should be understood simply as calling for a
"triumph of common sense" over strict theories of pacta sunt ser'
For him,
vanda where "agreements must be kept at all cost." 234
this means recognizing a modern relational-contract theory of
host state-investor relations, in which the relationship changes
dynamically over time in response to unforeseen developments.
Zakariya argues that the permanent sovereignty movement
merely stands for the proposition that the doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda must be qualified by the principle of rebus sic stantibus
(changed circumstances).235 And Riad claims that the effect of
the permanent sovereignty resolutions has been to establish that
compensation for nationalization (or breach of contract) must
be paid, but that the precise amount should be "calculated on an
equitable basis in accordance with the circumstances relevant to
with foreign investors, but he would require the state to provide the investor with a
monetary "indemnity for the consequences of the [state's] interference" with the contract. FRIEDMANN, supra note 7, at 202. The amount of the indemnity would equal at
least the investor's damnum emergens, and could also include lost profits, though lost
profits might be justifiably denied in cases involving overwhelming necessity. Id. at 20405. Friedmann suggests that in practice many disputes over breaches of international
concession agreements settle somewhere between the minimum of damnum emergens
and the maximum of damnum emergens plus lucrum cesans. Id. at 205.
232. Geiger, supra note 223, at 102-03.
233. Subrata Roy Chowdhury, PermanentSovereignty over NaturalResources, in PERMANENT SOVEREIGNY' OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 6, 15 (Kamal
Hossain & Subrata Roy Chowdhury eds., 1984).
234. Samuel KB.Asante, Stability of ContractualRelations in the TransnationalInvestment Process, 28 INT'L & Come. L. Q. 401, 405, 408 (1979).
235. Hasan S. Zakariya, Changed Circumstances and the Continued Validity of Mineral
Development Contracts, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
263 (Kamal Hossain ed., 1980).
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23 6

And finally, the fourth caveat is to admit the very rare instances of language in arbitral awards that is arguably hostile to
the principle of pacta sunt servanda as it has been repeatedly affirmed in the awards already discussed above, particularly-and
apparently only-in the jurisprudence of the sui generis Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal.23 7 But in these cases the statements at issue are
clearly dicta, and they are quite vigorously disputed by other
members of the tribunal and are not reflective of actual outcomes of Tribunal awards. In essence, what these occasional
statements suggest is that some debate continues to percolate as
to whether the proper standard of compensation under international law for a subset of nationalization scenarios is an inflexible
one, always requiring "full" compensation-by which is meant
compensation including lost profits-or whether tribunals enjoy
some limited measure of flexibility in determining how much
compensation is 'just" or "fair." 238 What is clear is that in all of
the available adjudicated cases, including those of the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal, investors received substantial and meaningful
awards of compensation, often approximating the "full" compensation that investors would receive if, for example, their
claims were being litigated before a U.S. court under the Fifth
236. Taric Fouad A. Riad, Host Countries'PermanentSovereignty over NaturalResources
and Protectionof Foreign Investors, 39 REVUE EcYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 35, 79

(1983). Riad's claim is similar to that of Sornarajah, a well-known and respected critic
of strong international legal rights for foreign investors. See generally M. Sornarajah,
Compensation for Nationalization Expropriation: The Emergence of New Standards, 13 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 108 (1979).

237. See, for example,Judge Lagergren's statement in INA Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 184-161-1, 8 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRiB. REP. 373, 386-90 (Aug. 12, 1985),
which speculates that in a hypothetical case of "lawful large-scale nationalizations in a
state undergoing a process of radical economic restructuring" the standard of adequate
(or fair market value) compensation, under which lost profits should be awarded,
would "normally" have to be "discounted," or Judge Virally's statement in Amoco Int'l
Fin. Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 310-56-3, 15-11 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 189, 242-43 (July
14, 1987) that the duty of states to honor contractual obligations did not mean that
"private interests [are] permitted to prevail over duly established public interest, making impossible actions required for the public good" and that "private parties who contract with a public entity are only entitled to fair compensation when measures of public
policy are implemented at the expense of their contract rights." Virally's views in the
case have attracted strong academic criticism, see, e.g., HicINS, supra note 165, at 14344, and neither his nor Judge Lagergren's have ever been applied in actual awards.
238. Compare M.H. Mendelson, What Price Expropriation?Compensationfor Expropriation: The Case Law, 79 A-m. J. INT'L L. 414 (1985), with Oscar Schacter, Compensation
Case: Leading and Misleading, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 420 (1985).
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Amendment's "takings" clause.2 39
VI. SOME SPECULATIVE CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This Article opened by quoting from McDougal and Lasswell's famous proposal to identify and appraise "diverse systems
of public order,"24 0 and it seems fitting, and not just for reasons
of symmetry, to close the Article by quoting from the same proposal, as doing so allows us to explore, albeit briefly, my argument's larger but also more speculative implications.
McDougal and Lasswell were primarily concerned with critiquing the "make-believe" description of international law
promulgated by "traditional legal scholars" who gave "unquestioning verbal deference to the proposition that if there is any
international law at all, it is a universal law, embracing the organized governments of the world community as a whole." 241 The
problem with "make-believe universalism" was in part that it ig239. Cf Haliburton Fales, A Comparisonfor Nationalizationof Alien Property with Standards of Compensation under United States Domestic Law, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 871, 901
(1983). The article states that:
The principal conclusion that can be drawn from a study of the law in different system is that ... the sense ofjustice which pervades all legal systems tends
[T]his is
to lead to very similar results by sometimes quite different paths ....
true as well in the law of compensation . . . both for the nationalization of
alien property under international standards and for the law of compensation
applied in the United States under analogous conditions.
Id.; Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the
InternationalLaw of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 503 (1991).
Norton points out that:
Recent international tribunals have consistently affirmed a requirement under
international law that full compensation be paid for expropriations of foreign
property. A theoretical debate persists over the scope of possible exceptions to
that standard, but the recent decisions suggest that only truly extraordinary
circumstances would be likely to support such exceptions.
Norton, supra, at 503.
I should emphasize that I do not mean to slight the potential legal or practical
difficulties that investors might face when seeking execution of awards against sovereign
states, such as where the executing state recognizes a strong rule of sovereign immunity
against execution, or where the host state does not have easily attachable assets abroad.
Where execution is impossible, the practical value of a strong international principle of
pacta sunt servanda is obviously reduced. However, there is little reason to think that
arbitral awards rendered under BITs are any less likely to suffer from problems of execution than arbitral awards rendered under contract, especially given the supporting
structure of the New York Convention, supra note 128, and other international arbitral
conventions.
240. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 1.
241. Id. at 2.
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nored the diversity of views as to what supposedly universal principles meant, or how they should be applied.2 4 2 It also slighted
the fact that supposedly universal rules might reify particular "allocations of power" or particular positions on contested public
policy issues; 24 ' and it tended to privilege a single actor-the
state-as the primary generator of universal principles, while ignoring the plurality of sub-state or supra-state sources of internationally relevant laws, norms, and patterns of behavior.2 44

If the modern BIT-based system of international investment
law has a fundamental problem, the problem principally lies in
the system's universalistic claims and pretensions, rather than in
the occasional set of inconsistent arbitral decisions that other
scholars have identified as the primary source of a crisis of legitimacy. 2 45 These universalistic claims and pretensions manifest
themselves in at least two ways.
The first manifestation is the increasing tendency of analysts
to view BIT promises as not simply lex specialis, binding only between treaty partners, 24 6 but as both indicative of and constituting a universal, one-size-fits-all, customary international law of
foreign investment that binds all states, whether they wish to be
bound or not. Judge Schwebel has described this approach
rather grandiosely as an "essentially unified law of foreign investment" that has "reshaped" the customary international law in a
way that "vault[s] over the traditional divide between capital-exporting and capital-importing states. "247
The second and interrelated manifestation is the fact that
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See Berman, supra note 1, at 301-02.
245. For the most important article on inconsistent decisions as causing a crisis of
legitimacy, see Franck, supra note 22. See also Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future?, 12 U.C. DAVSJ. INT'L L. & POL'y 47 (2005).
246. See, e.g., Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of BilateralInvestment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary InternationalLaw, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 327 (1994) (arguing
that BITs do not create customary international law).
247. Stephen M. Schwebel, Investor-State Disputes and the Development of International
Law: The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary InternationalLaw, 98 AM.
Soc'y INr'L L. PROC. 27 (2004) [hereinafter Investor-State Disputes]. See generally Matthew C. Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investor Rights?, 27 U. PA. J. INt"L
ECON. L. 79 (2006) (taking a skeptical view of the wisdom of BITs as creating a universal
"common law" for foreign investment); Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification ofInternational Investment Law, 13 L. & Bus. REv. kM. 155, 165 (2007) (suggesting that BITs could
embody "general principles of law").
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the development of this new "common law of investment" has
been placed primarily in the hands of an exceedingly small pool
of super-elite, like-minded international lawyers who operate
largely divorced from any municipal political process, who have
shown a tendency to interpret the vague language of BITs expansively in favor of new customary international legal rights for
investors, 248 and who tend to view the current system as but an
intermediate stage in a process intended to lead, at their direcglobal harmonization of intertion, to an eventual and2 4complete
9
national economic law.
These manifestations together suggest a system of hubristic
ambition that ignores at its peril the basic truths that foreign
investment is, at least at some level, inherently controversial, that
ideas about the value of foreign investment will ebb and flow
over time, and that states do not, or will not always, agree on the
proper content of the package of legal rights that foreign investors should enjoy. The creation of foreign investment law and
policy is necessarily a political task, entailing in some instances
sensitive decisions about the allocation of valuable rights, or
about the "allocation of power," to quote McDougal and Lasswell
again. 2 5° The danger is that the current system reifies as universal and justifies as natural and necessary a certain allocation of
power that deviates from that which others, with legitimate-if
largely unrecognized stakes-in the shape and content of foreign investment law, would choose to implement if they were
among the privileged few charged with the constitution of these
new and supposedly universal principles.
For the reasons above, I would modestly suggest that a minimalist system of international investment law may provide a
more desirable alternative to BITs, and one more resilient to the
political challenges that have caused a small but growing num248. This tendency toward expansive, pro-investor interpretations is evident, for
example, in the well-known Tecmed award, which asserted that customary international
law now recognizes that investors have a broad right to operate in a "transparent" policy
environment. See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 (Award), para. 154 (May 29, 2003); cf Robbins, supra
note 27 (discussing the danger that customary international "minimum treatment" provisions in BITs may lead tribunals to increasingly impose "positive obligations" upon
host states, risking a political backlash).
249. See Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Foreign Investment Law: How Customary is Custom?, 99 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 97, 98 (2005).
250. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 1.
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ber of states to avoid, abandon, or otherwise attempt to undermine the BIT regime as no longer compatible with their national
25 1
interests.
What would a minimalist system entail? A fuller discussion
must await a future article, but it would consist of a very small
core of truly universal, foundational principles, roughly akin to
McDougal and Lasswell's basic principle of human dignity.
Those foundational principles would primarily include the principle of pacta sunt servanda and the supporting principle that
states are free to commit themselves to resolving their investment disputes by resort to neutral adjudicators. These foundational "international" principles could be supplemented by
whatever terms of bargain the particular host state and the particular investor would wish to govern their relationship, with this
bargained-for law, complemented by the host state's municipal
law where necessary, operating as a true lex specialis. In other
words, a minimalist system would rely to a largely exclusive extent on the parties to a particular investment relationship to provide the substantive governing legal content, with the relationship supported "internationally" by the relatively simple notion
that promises should, normally, be kept.
This is the regime of contract law, described above, that has
long existed independently of the more complicated and controversial trapping of BITs. A system that relies on internationally-enforceable investment contracts as the main law governing
foreign investment would allow the expression of diverse approaches to foreign investment policy. It would also allow host
states to moderate their investment-related legal commitments
on a case-by-case basis. If changing circumstances suggest that
particular guarantees such as guaranteed access to international
251. See, e.g., Ann Capling & Kim Richard Nossal, Blowback: Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms in International Trade Agreements, 19 GOVERNANCE 151 (2006)
(describing Australia's successful resistance to including an investor-state arbitration
provision in its recent FTA with the United States); In Dispute: Bolivia's ICSID withdrawal
raises fear of mass exodus, FDI MAGAZINE, Dec. 3, 2007, http://www.fdimagazine.com/
news/fullstory.php/aid/2206/In_Dispute:_Bolivia_92sICSIDwithdrawalraisesfear_
of massexodus.html (discussing Bolivia's withdrawal from ICSID and discontent with
the ICSID system among other developing countries); Chung, supra note 24, at 969-75
(describing examples of states "escaping the unfair BIT regime by defying arbitration");
Schwebel, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 243, at 30 (chastising the United States for
its "deplorable" decision to weaken investor rights contained in the 2004 model United
States BIT, a decision made in light of fears that tribunals were interpreting the provisions of earlier BITs too expansively).
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arbitration or promises of "fair and equitable treatment" are
growing too costly, governments could easily amend their bargaining positions and their contractual practices on a rolling basis as existing agreements expire. As new deals are being negotiated or renegotiated on a regular basis, particular bargains in
force at a particular time-particular allocations of power-are
more likely to reflect current perceived needs, current political
and economic sensibilities, and current constellations of bargaining power.
In short, a minimalist international investment law may
prove to be more resilient than the current BIT system to
changes in ideas about the costs and benefits of foreign investment; moreover, precisely because it would avoid the universalistic pretensions of BITs, it would be more resilient to changes in
ideas about the costs and benefits of particular international legal guarantees to foreign investors. A minimalistic international
investment law would place primary responsibility for generating
relationship-specific foreign investment law squarely on the
shoulders of host states and investors, with this law manifesting
itself in part, and primarily, in the form of investment contracts
supported, as they have long been supported, by a robust international legal principle of pacta sunt servanda.

